Category Archives: Mediterranean

by | 23 Apr 2015 · 22:41

Post Meeting Remarks from Council President Tusk: EU to destroy smugglers’ boats in line with int’l law; triple resources for Frontex Operation Triton; seek better co-operation with countries of origin and transit; coordinate resettlement of more refugees

Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the special European Council meeting on migratory pressures in the Mediterranean – 23/04/2015, 22:00

Full Text:

“Good evening. Today, we discussed the dramatic situation in the Mediterranean at the highest political level. Saving the lives of innocent people is the number one priority. But saving lives is not just about rescuing people at sea. It is also about stopping the smugglers and addressing irregular migration.

Let me be clear. Europe did not cause this tragedy. But that does not mean we can be indifferent. We are facing a difficult summer and we need to be ready to act.

Therefore, leaders have agreed four priority areas for action.
First, leaders have asked the High Representative to propose actions in order to capture and destroy the smugglers’ vessels before they can be used. Naturally, this will be in line with international law and respect for human rights. We will step up co-operation against smuggling networks by working through Europol, and by deploying immigration officers to third countries.

Second, we have agreed to triple the resources available to Triton, our border mission in the Central Mediterranean, and to enhance its operational capability. The mission will continue to carry out its mandate and respond to distress calls where necessary. I am happy to announce that leaders have already pledged significantly greater support, including many more vessels, aircraft and experts, and money.

Third, we need to limit irregular migration flows and to discourage people from putting their lives at risk. This means better co-operation with the countries of origin and transit, especially the countries around Libya.

Finally, we will do more on refugee protection. The European Union will help front-line Member States under pressure and co-ordinate the resettlement of more people to Europe on a voluntary basis, and with an option for emergency relocation. For those who do not qualify as refugees, we will operate an effective returns policy.
Leaders had no illusions that we would solve this international human emergency today. Therefore, we have tasked the Commission, the Council and the High Representative to step up their work based on what we have now agreed. This issue remains our priority and the European Council will come back to it in June.

As a final remark, let me repeat that the European Union is completely opposed to the death penalty. It cannot be the answer to drug trafficking. I am referring here to Mr Atlaoui, the French citizen who has been condemned by the Indonesian authorities. Thank you.”

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by | 23 Apr 2015 · 06:33

Text of Draft European Council Statement (via Statewatch)

From Statewatch, here is the text of the Draft European Council Statement that will be considered today:

DRAFT EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT

1. The situation in the Mediterranean is a tragedy. The European Union will mobilise all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency that we face, in cooperation with the countries of origin and transit. Our immediate priority is to prevent more people from dying at sea.

2. We have therefore decided to strengthen our presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity. Given that instability in Libya creates an ideal environment for the criminal activities of traffickers, we will actively support all UN-led efforts towards re-establishing government authority in Libya. We will also step up efforts to address conflict and instability as key push factors of migration, including in Syria.

3. We today commit to:

Strengthening our presence at sea

a)rapidly reinforce EU Operations Triton and Poseidon by at least doubling the financial resources for this purpose in 2015 and 2016 and reinforcing the number of assets, thus allowing to increase the search and rescue possibilities within the mandate of FRONTEX; [p.m.: welcome pledges]

Fighting traffickers

b) disrupt trafficking networks, bring the perpetrators to justice and seize their assets, through swift action by Member State authorities in co-operation with EUROPOL, FRONTEX, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and EUROJUST, as well as through increased intelligence and police-cooperation with third countries;

c) undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers. The High Representative is invited to immediately begin preparations for a possible CSDP operation to this effect, in accordance with international law;

d) use EUROPOL to detect and request removal of internet content used by traffickers to attract migrants and refugees, in accordance with national constitutions;

Preventing illegal migration flows

e) increase support to Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Mali and Niger among others, to monitor and control the land borders and routes in order to prevent potential migrants from gaining access to Mediterranean shores, building on current CSDP operations in the region, as well as on regional cooperation frameworks (Rabat and Khartoum processes); step up dialogue with the African Union at all levels on all these issues;

f) deploy European migration liaison officers in key countries to gather information on migratory flows, co-ordinate with national liaison officers, and co-operate directly with the local authorities;

g) work with regional partners in building capacity for maritime border management and search and rescue operations;

h) launch Regional Development and Protection programmes for North Africa and the Horn of Africa;

i) invite the Commission and the High Representative to mobilise all tools, including through development cooperation, to promote readmission of unauthorised economic migrants to countries of origin, working closely with the International Organisation for Migration;

j) set up a new return programme for the rapid return of irregular migrants from frontline Member States, coordinated by FRONTEX;

Reinforcing internal solidarity

k) set up a first voluntary pilot project on resettlement, offering at least 5,000 places to persons qualifying for protection;

l) increase emergency aid to frontline Member States and consider options for organising emergency relocation between Member States;

m) deploy EASO teams in frontline Member States for joint processing of asylum applications, including registration and finger-printing.

4.The EU institutions and the Member States will work immediately on the full implementation of these orientations. The European Council looks forward to the Commission Communication on a European Agenda for Migration, in order to develop a more systemic and geographically comprehensive EU approach to migration. The European Council will remain seized of the situation and will closely monitor the implementation of these orientations. The Council and the Commission will report to the European Council in June.

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by | 23 Apr 2015 · 06:14

Recent UN Security Council Statements on Libya and Migrants

The special meeting of the European Council will occur later today. Based on various press reports, it seems that the EU will decide to pursue several courses of actions in response to the situation in the Mediterranean, including taking steps – presumably by military force – to identify, capture and destroy migrant boats in Libya before the boats are used by smugglers. HR Federica Mogherini will reportedly be instructed to seek authorisation for the military strikes from the UN. (Click here (IT) and here (EN) for articles)  (Here is the Draft European Council Statement via Statewatch.)

The most recent UN Security Council resolution on Libya (Resolution 2213) was adopted on 27 March 2015; the Resolution extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 September 2015. The Resolution also took note of, among other matters, the dire situation faced by migrants in Libya and called on the Libyan government to promote and protect “the human rights of all persons in Libya, particularly those of African migrants and other foreign nationals.”

On 21 April, after the most recent migrant boat accident, the Security Council released a Press Statement regarding the boat accident and “expressed their concern at the implications for regional stability posed by transnational organized crime and illicit activities such as the smuggling of migrants…”

The press statement is not a formal statement from the Security Council, but may provide some limited insight into how members of the Security Council view the relationship between the flow of migrant boats and a possible threat to international peace and security and how the Security Council might respond to the EU request.

Full Text of the 21 April 2015 Press Statement:

“Security Council Press Statement on Recent Maritime Tragedy in Mediterranean Sea

The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Dina Kawar (Jordan):

The members of the Security Council deplored the recent maritime tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea that resulted in hundreds of casualties, and extended their deepest condolences to all those affected and to their families.

The members of the Security Council expressed their grave concern at the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of Libya.

The members of the Security Council expressed their concern at the implications for regional stability posed by transnational organized crime and illicit activities such as the smuggling of migrants, condemned and deplored the said acts and underlined the need to bring the perpetrators of these acts to justice.

The members of the Security Council called for the full implementation by State Parties of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The members of the Security Council expressed their strong support to countries in the region affected by the smuggling of migrants and emphasized the need to step up coordination of international efforts in order to strengthen a global response to this common challenge, and in order to protect these vulnerable migrants from being victimized by human traffickers.

The members of the Security Council urged all Member States, including countries of origin and transit, to cooperate with each other and with relevant international and regional organizations, including the IOM [International Organization for Migration], in addressing illicit migration flows, and dismantling smuggling networks in the region.

In that regard, the members of the Security Council urged all States to comply with their applicable obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law.

For information media. Not an official record.”

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by | 22 Apr 2015 · 07:48

The EU’s Proposed Plan to Destroy Migrant Boats in Libya Must be Rejected by the European Council

A plan for EU Member States to capture or destroy the boats used by people smugglers in the Mediterranean is one of ten possible courses of action that will be considered during the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on the Situation in the Mediterranean that will be held on 23 April.

The boat destruction proposal should be rejected for multiple reasons. There is no basis in law for the proposal and it would endanger lives of innocent people including migrants and fishermen, among others. It would certainly have little effect on its intended target, the people smugglers.

EU migration commissioner Avramopoulos described the plan, which has been recommended by the Foreign Affairs Council which met on 20 April, as a civil-military operation which would “capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers.” Avramopoulos reportedly compared the proposed EU boat destruction plan to Operation ATALANTA, the EU’s maritime operation against piracy off Somalia, saying that Atalanta “should inspire us for new operations against smugglers in the Mediterranean.”

As is always the case, the specific details of the proposed plan matter. There are situations where the destruction of a migrant boat under certain circumstances may be perfectly legal and otherwise appropriate. For example after a rescue operation when migrants have been safely removed from an unflagged and unseaworthy vessel, it may be appropriate for that vessel to be destroyed at sea rather than taking it in tow or leaving it adrift and thereby creating a navigational hazard. In such circumstances, there is no reason for an EU coast guard vessel, after migrants have been transferred from a migrant boat, to stand by and allow smugglers to take possession of the now empty migrant boat.

But if the EU boat destruction plan were to authorise the use of armed force to capture or destroy a smuggling boat at sea, particularly in the face of armed resistance from people smugglers, or if it were to authorise the destruction of boats at anchor in Libyan harbours, it is difficult to imagine how such a plan could be carried without endangering the lives of migrants and fisherman and thereby violating international humanitarian and human rights law.

Frontex and Italian patrol boats have already experienced armed threats at sea during rescue operations. One situation occurred on 13 April when armed people smugglers fired into the air to recover an empty migrant boat after an Italian tugboat and the Icelandic Coast Guard vessel Týr deployed by Frontex had rescued a group of migrants.  The Frontex vessel did not engage the people smugglers with force and allowed the smugglers to return to Libya with the empty migrant boat. If Frontex vessels or coast guard vessels were now to be called upon to use some level of appropriate force to prevent such incidents, rescue operations would be delayed, further complicated, and the rescued migrants would be placed in danger.

In regard to the possible destruction of boats at anchor in a Libyan harbour, the EU cannot engage in the proposed civil-military operation without having a legal basis to do so. One possible source of authority would be the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the UN Security Council, but this would require the finding that the flow of migrant boats constitutes a threat to international peace and security. While the security situation in Libya or Syria might well constitute such a threat, the large scale movement of migrants by people smugglers does not.

Chapter VII has of course been invoked to authorise the EU Operation ATALANTA after the Security Council authorised of the use of force off Somalia in international waters and in Somalian territorial waters (as well as within Somalian territory). But the legal basis for Operation ATALANTA has no relevance to the proposed EU boat destruction plan. The suppression of piracy in international waters is authorised and governed by specialized international law and customary international practice relating to the suppression of piracy. There is no equivalent basis in international law for the suppression of people smuggling.

Chapter VII was likewise invoked in 2011 to authorise the use of force by NATO in Libya. The Security Council again made the necessary determination that the situation in Libya at the time was a threat to international peace. Among the factors referenced by the Security Council in Resolution 1973 was the plight of refugees and foreign workers who were subject to violence and who were forced to flee Libya. The resolution praised Tunisia and Egypt for protecting the fleeing refugees and called on the international community to support the efforts. It would be repugnant if today the ongoing violence in Libya was somehow used as a legal basis for a use of force which would serve to trap and endanger migrants, rather than making them safer.

In addition to the serious legal questions relating to the use of force to capture and destroy smugglers’ boats, there are serious practical concerns. Take the example of the unprecedented boat disaster and the 900 deaths that occurred earlier this week. One of the likely reasons for the massive death toll was the large number of persons who were locked below the main deck of the boat. What precautions would prevent the destruction of a suspected smuggling vessel at anchor with hundreds of people below deck and out of sight? Would the EU boat destruction plan require that any capture or destruction of a suspected smuggling boat be carried out by deploying EU military personnel on the ground in Libya with the resulting ability to more closely inspect a vessel before its destruction? Or would the plan permit destruction of a suspected smuggling boat by armed drones or military aircraft? If the destruction could occur through the use of aircraft, people will be killed, and it is more likely that those who will be killed will be migrants or innocent fisherman and not the people smugglers.

The easiest targets for destruction will be the larger fishing vessels that are being used by the people smugglers. But not so long ago the smuggling boats of choice were the Zodiacs and other large or medium–sized inflatable boats powered by outboard engines. This type of boat can be easily stored in vehicles or storage buildings and quickly moved into the water when needed. It would be an easy tactical shift on the part of the people smugglers to resume the use of inflatables if the larger fishing vessels were no longer obtainable.

The European Council needs to take new and significant steps to respond to this crisis. A focus on people smugglers should certainly be something that is addressed, but while the people smugglers are taking advantage of the crisis, they are not the cause. The EU response needs to instead focus on expanded search and rescue (i.e. Mare Nostrum plus – not Operation Triton plus) and creating alternative safe paths for people to seek protection in the EU or in other appropriate countries. The boat destruction plan should be rejected.

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by | 05 Jan 2015 · 07:37

Frontex: Preliminary Figures Indicate 270,000 Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers Reached EU in 2104 – Double Previous Record Set in 2011

In an interview with EFE, “Frontex Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias Fernandez said the numbers for 2014 nearly doubled the previous record of 141,000 that was registered in 2011 and attributed to spillovers from the Arab Spring. … [Arias Fernandez] noted that the number of immigrants fleeing their countries seeking international protection has increased. ‘A few years ago, immigration for economic reasons was estimated at 50 percent and the same percentage for political refugees, while in 2014 about 80 percent of immigrants to the EU will be asylum seekers,’ he said. Although Frontex will not reveal specific details until mid-January 2014, [Arias Fernandez] said the total figure will likely exceed 270,000 people, as about 260,000 migrants were recorded till November….”

Click here (EN) or here (ES) for articles.

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by | 02 Jan 2015 · 20:43

UNHCR: Urgent European Action Needed in Mediterranean

Statement by Vincent Cochetel, UNHCR Europe Bureau Director, on new boat arrival in Italy:

“The use of larger cargo ships is a new trend, but it is part of an ongoing and worrying situation that can no longer be ignored by European governments. We need urgent European concerted action in the Mediterranean Sea, increasing efforts to rescue people at sea and stepping up efforts to provide legal alternatives to dangerous voyages. Without safer ways for refugees to find safety in Europe, we won’t be able to reduce the multiple risks and dangers posed by these movements at sea.

UNHCR thanks the Italian authorities for their response to these latest incidents, despite the phasing down of the Mare Nostrum operation. We have expressed concerns over the ending of this operation without a similar European search-and-rescue operation to replace it. This will undoubtedly increase the risk for those trying to find safety in Europe.”

For more information on this topic, please contact:

In Geneva, William Spindler on mobile +41 79 217 3011, spindler@unhcr.org
In Geneva, Ariane Rummery on mobile +41 79 200 7617, rummery@unhcr.org

Click here for Statement.

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by | 16 Apr 2014 · 04:37

Panel Discussion: “Heading to Europe: Safe Haven or Graveyard?,” Radboud University Nijmegen, 16 May

From the organizers:

The Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law of the European Society of International Law, the Centre for Migration Law of the Radboud University Nijmegen and the Amsterdam Center for International Law of the University of Amsterdam are pleased to announce ‘Heading to Europe: Safe Haven or Graveyard?’, a panel discussion on migration by sea in the Mediterranean. The panel discussion will be held on 16 May 2014 at the Radboud University Nijmegen.

The year of 2013 has demonstrated that the tragedy of thousands of migrants and refugees drowning on the shores of Europe is now a common occurrence. The fate of those who perished near the Italian island of Lampedusa has brought the urgency of the situation into focus. The aim of the panel discussion is to provide an overview of the legal rules and processes applicable to migration by sea in the Mediterranean and to reflect on their wider sociological implications.

The panel discussion consists of two panels, each followed by a plenary discussion. In the first panel, legal experts working in the field of academia and at stakeholder organizations (e.g. UN Refugee Agency, Council of Europe, European Union) focus on legal aspects of boat migration in the Mediterranean. The second panel brings together scholars and practitioners with first-hand experience from transit countries to discuss the sociological effects of the legal rules and processes. Click here for the complete program, and here for more information on the panelists.

The organizing partners cordially invite interested scholars, governments officials, practitioners and advanced students to join in the panel discussion ‘Heading to Europe: Safe Haven or Graveyard?’. Active participation in the discussion is strongly encouraged. Participation is free of charge. For participation, please register at the bottom of this page. For inquiries, please contact Lisa-Marie Komp at lisa-marie.komp@law-school.de.

Location is the CPO-zaal, Spinozagebouw at the Radboud University in Nijmegen (Montessorilaan 3).

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER

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by | 25 Mar 2014 · 05:31

“Mediterranean flows into Europe: Migration and the EU’s foreign policy” – Analysis by European Parliament DG for External Policies

The EP’s Directorate-General for External Policies just released an Analysis, “Mediterranean flows into Europe: Migration and the EU’s foreign policy,” in which it reviews the EU’s external policies and instruments relating to migration in the Mediterranean, including the Mediterranean Task Force established after 3 October 2013 tragedy at Lampedusa in which over 350 people died.

The Analysis describes the serious shortcomings of the security-driven approach that has been taken by the EU. Noting, for example, that “it is unclear whether the militarisation of EU border management (resulting from a tighter relation between the CSDP and Frontex) will actually save lives or create even more danger for migrants” and that “[t]he increasing militarisation of the issue of irregular migration was underscored in December 2013, when the European Council called for the establishment of an EU Maritime Security Strategy by June 2014 as well as for increased synergies between the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and freedom/security/justice actors to tackle illegal migration.”

The Analysis discusses possible ways in which the European Parliament might play a more significant role in the shaping of future policies:

“The coming months – which will include the European elections and the June 2014 Council – present an important opportunity for the EP to engage politically with the topic of migration in the Mediterranean. As outlined above, numerous EU external policies and instruments deal with migration in the region; […]

All should incorporate respect for human rights as a central concern and pursue the overall goals of prevention, protection and solidarity. The EP has tools at hand to contribute effectively to those objectives. The EP should use its co-decision powers to ensure the inclusion of human rights provisions in all migration-related legislation, and its power of consent to guarantee that international agreements contain effective human rights guarantees. The EP’s budgetary powers also allow the institution to link assistance to third countries to proper human rights monitoring mechanisms.

Most pressingly, the EP should advocate the implementation of the actions recommended by the Mediterranean Task Force set up by the Commission. The EP should also use the opportunities generated by inter-parliamentary relations (such as the 27th ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly in March and the EU-Africa summit in April) to engage in a dialogue about migration with third countries. This dialogue should foster cooperation in the management of regular migration and in the fight against irregular migration and trafficking networks, with special emphasis on the need to prevent migrants from embarking on dangerous journeys to the EU.

The dialogue should also seek to frame Mediterranean migration within a wider perspective, possibly in the following ways:

  • Steer away from excessively militarised and security-centred approaches. The EP should ensure that strict human rights standards are respected in the fight against organised crime and smugglers’ networks, and that a clear distinction is drawn between criminal networks and their victims. The EU should prevent the criminalisation of migrants and of humanitarian organisations supporting migrants.
  • Highlight the importance of good governance, and of good migration governance more specifically. By reinforcing the EU’s Regional Development and Protection Programmes, for example, the Union can develop a comprehensive and long-term framework to develop and enhance the capacities of migration management and national asylum systems in Mediterranean countries.
  • Demand full respect for humanitarian law, refugee protection and human rights (including the rights of non-nationals) in crisis situations, and stress that humanitarian access must be guaranteed to provide life-saving supplies.
  • Recognise the importance and challenges that South-South and intra-African migration represent for countries in the southern Mediterranean, rather than focussing solely on the (much smaller) flows towards the EU.
  • Encourage further research on the migration-development nexus and explore the positive impact of human mobility on socioeconomic development.
  • Encourage EU Member States to facilitate and speed up their procedures to grant asylum and EU protected status, whilst better differentiating between refugees and irregular migrants. The EP should respect the competence of the Member States in this regard, but could also encourage Member States – in cooperation with the UNHCR – to increase their quotas for resettling refugees not adequately protected in third countries. The EP should support the Mediterranean Task Force’s proposed feasibility study on the joint processing of protection claims outside the EU, and the Commission’s proposal to move towards a common approach for humanitarian permits and visas.

All these actions would contribute to reshaping the EU’s external action related to migration, notably in the Mediterranean. They would also enhance the EU’s credibility vis-à-vis those third countries that accept significant number of migrants and refugees, and that most directly bear the consequences of their neighbours’ conflicts. (This is the case today for Lebanon and Turkey, as a result of the Syrian civil war). A modified EU approach could also project a more nuanced and positive view of migration – a change that might, in turn, influence the way migration is perceived more broadly within the EU.”

Click here or here for the Analysis.

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by | 24 Mar 2014 · 05:27

Statewatch Analysis – “New EU rules on maritime surveillance: will they stop the deaths and push-backs in the Mediterranean?”

Statewatch last month released a new Analysis of the EU Regulation for Frontex-coordinated surveillance of external sea borders which is scheduled for a plenary vote in the European Parliament in April.  The Analysis, written by Prof. Steve Peers, Univ. of Essex Law School, reviews the enhanced protections to be afforded to intercepted or rescued migrants relative to the earlier Council Decision which was annulled by the CJEU.  The Analysis also highlights concerns with various provisions within the Regulation, including:

  • One significant concern with the Regulation is due to the fact that “the Regulation does not contemplate the scenario of migrants being intercepted in the territorial waters of third States.”  (Frenzen’s Note: This raises a serious concern in regard to the push-back and interception practices which have been carried out for many years within the territorial waters of Mauritania and Senegal within Frontex’s Operation Hera.  Additionally, prior to the Libyan revolution, Libya authorised Italy to conduct joint maritime patrols within Libyan territorial waters.  It is safe to assume that Frontex and some EU Member States will continue to seek the ability to intercept migrant boats within the territorial waters of third States.);
  • While the Regulation requires that migrants intercepted in the territorial sea or contiguous zone of an EU Member State be disembarked in that Member State, “this [requirement] is subject to a crucial exception: it is possible under the Regulation that a vessel that has made it this close to a Member State could still be ordered to alter course towards another destination.”;
  • While the bulk of the EU’s asylum legislation does not apply [to interceptions which occur outside of the territorial sea of a Member State,] the EU’s qualification Directive does – since there is nothing in the text of that Directive to limit its territorial scope. But the wording of the Regulation is confusing in this regard, since it does not refer to the detailed text of that Directive but rather to general standards on non-refoulement, which are different from that Directive in some respects….”;
  • Member States are required to “use all means” to identify intercepted migrants, assess their particular circumstances, and inform them of the intended place of disembarkation, in order to give the migrants the opportunity to assert a non-refoulement claim.  The Regulation states that the Frontex operational plan, “where necessary,” must provide for interpreters and legal advisors on shore. “[T]he Council Presidency points out the ‘wiggle room’ granted by the words ‘where necessary’ and ‘use all means.’”

Click here or here for Statewatch Analysis.

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by | 16 Oct 2013 · 05:50

EU Mediterranean States Oppose Provisions of Proposed Frontex Sea Borders Regulation Relating to Rescue and Disembarkation

[16 Oct. UPDATE: The document from the six states opposing the proposed Regulation is available here.]

One week ago Commissioner Cecilia Malmström called for an “extensive Frontex search and rescue operation that would cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain.” Yesterday the ANSA news service reported that all six EU Mediterranean states (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, France and Spain) have voiced opposition to the proposed Frontex Sea Borders Regulation (COM(2013) 197 final) and specifically to Articles 9 and 10 relating to “Search and Rescue Situations” and “Disembarkation.” ANSA reported that the six member states “expressed disapproval of the draft and called it ‘unacceptable for practical and legal reasons’.”  The six countries have reportedly taken the position that there is no need for further regulations pertaining to rescue at sea or post-rescue places of disembarkation since other international laws already “deal ‘amply’ with the matters.”

As you may recall, the earlier version of the Frontex Sea Borders Rule in the form of a Decision was adopted by the European Council in 2010 (Decision 2010/252/EU).  The Decision was subsequently annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the ground that it introduced new essential elements into the Schengen Borders Code by way of the provisions on interception, rescue and disembarkation and that such substantive changes required the consideration and approval of the European Parliament. (European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Case C-355/10, 5 Sept. 2012). The proposed replacement for the annulled Decision is in the form of a Regulation but is fairly similar in content.

While the ANSA report does not identify the specific reasons why the six states are opposing the proposal, one can speculate that the objections to Art. 9, Search and Rescue Situations, may be based on a perception that it would expand the obligation to rescue under certain circumstances.  For example the Article requires that even in the absence of a distress call, a rescue operation might still be required if other factors are present, including:

  • the seaworthiness of the ship and the likelihood that the ship will not reach its final destination;
  • the number of passengers in relation to the type and condition of the ship;
  • the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, water, food to reach a shore;
  • the presence of passengers in urgent need of medical assistance;
  • the presence of deceased passengers;
  • the presence of pregnant women or children.

The objections by the six states to Art. 10 regarding places of disembarkation are most likely due to the states’ conflicting positions regarding where disembarkation should occur.  While Art. 10 creates a procedure for decisions regarding places of disembarkation to be made by participating member states in advance of joint operations, its provisions identify circumstances under which disembarkation in member state may occur when that state is not participating in the joint operation.  Malta and Italy in particular have long disagreed on where disembarkations are to occur.  This long standing disagreement obviously contradicts the claims made by the six opposing states that existing international laws already deal “amply” with the disembarkation issue.

Click here for ANSA article.

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by | 16 Oct 2013 · 05:24

Frontex FRAN Report for Q1 2013

In July of this year, Frontex released its first quarter (January – March) 2013 report. As in past quarters, the 70-page report provided in-depth information about irregular migration patterns at the EU external borders. The report is based on data provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities, and presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular migration indicators and one asylum  indicator (here is a link to our summary of the 2012 fourth quarter report).

In Q1 2013 all indicators of irregular migration were reduced in comparison with the final quarter of 2012. In most instances these declines were consistent with past documentation of seasonal variation; typically the first few months of each year are associated with reduced pressure at the border compared to other times of the year. Here are some highlights from the report focusing on the sea borders:

  • The Greek operation Aspida (see the 2012 Q4 summary for details) has resulted in a dramatic reduction of irregular migration across the Greek-Turkish border. As a result, one of the three alternative routes increasingly utilized is: migrants leaving the west coast of Turkey to illegally cross the Eastern Aegean Sea towards the Greek Islands. This border section ranked second at the EU level in terms of detections. Syrians and Afghans were both detected at similar frequencies of around 500 each over the three-month period.
  • The JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was also active during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

  • Syrians, were increasingly detected at the Greek sea border with Turkey (Eastern Aegean Sea) and the Bulgarian land border with Turkey.

  • There were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than ever before, with just 9 717 detections. The drop was limited mostly to sea borders.The JO Poseidon Land 2012 was active during Q1 2013.
    Screen Shot 2013-10-12 at 12.31.12 PM
    Here are excerpts from the Report focusing on the sea borders:
    [***]
    4.2 Routes
    • In the Eastern Mediterranean, detections tend to be characterised by Asian and some North African migrants illegally crossing the border from Turkey into Greece. In the second half of 2012 detections were much reduced following increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where most detections were previously reported (see Section 4.1.1.).
    • On the main Central Mediterranean route, which includes the Italian Pelagic Islands (Linosa, Lampione and Lampedusa) and Malta, most detections tend to be of migrants arriving on boats from North Africa. During the previous quarter there were fewer detections of North African nationalities such as Tunisians and Egyptians but there was a surge of migrants from sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea, the Gambia and Mali, all of which were detected in much higher numbers during the last there months of 2012 compared with Q3 2012. In the current reporting period, the number of detected Somalis decreased, resulting in the top three nationalities – Somalis, Gambians and Egyptians– being detected at similarly low levels of around 200–250 each over the three-month period (Fig. 5).Screen Shot 2013-10-12 at 1.57.51 PM

    [***]

    4.2.1 Eastern Mediterranean Route

    • In Q1 2013 there were 2 734 detections of il- legal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, which was a decrease of 66% compared to the same period in 2012 but nevertheless still constituting nearly 30% of all detections at the EU level. In effect, this route remained the major entry point to the Schengen area.

      With nearly 1 000 detections in Q1 2013, Syrians were by far the most detected nationality on this route. More than half of these detections were in the Eastern Aegean Sea region, with significant numbers also at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey.

      [***]

      1. East Aegean Sea

        This border section ranked second at the EU level in Q1 2013. The most frequently detected migrants were Syrians and Afghans, followed Sri Lankans, whose number has recently increased.

        The JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was operational throughout the reporting period, focusing on tackling the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

        Syrians have been the most commonly detected migrants during the operation so far in 2013. Most were men travelling alone but here were some family units, and all were heading for Sweden or Germany to claim asylum. Once they entered Turkey, those intending to enter the EU travelled to Istanbul in order to make contact with facilitation networks. They stayed in Istanbul for between 1–12 weeks before being taken by van to the west coast of Turkey to depart towards the Greek eastern Aegean Islands.

        Afghans were also detected in this region. Most were previously resident in Iran and had decided to travel to the EU due to deteriorating employment conditions. The Afghan community in Iran can easily find criminal networks that can facilitate them to Turkey and then to Greece. Once in Turkey, the Afghan migrants were transported by public transport to Istanbul and from there mainly by private transportation directly to departure area on the western coast of Turkey, where they boarded rubber boats destined for the Greek eastern Aegean Islands.

    [***]
    4.2.2 Central Mediterranean Route
    • Since early 2011 migrants from Tunisia have been among the most commonly detected migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean region but during the first three months of 2013 only 75 Tunisians were detected. In fact nearly all of the top 10 nationalities in Q1 2013 were detected in much lower numbers than during the final quarter of 2012.

      Migrants from Somalia ranked top in the region but were detected at their lowest level for over a year.

      [***]

      A total of 233 migrants from the Gambia were detected in the Central Mediterranean during Q1 2013 which is the highest ever level for this nationality resulting in them ranking second in this region, followed by 216 Egyptians.

      The JO Hermes 2012 was operational just for the first month of the reporting period. The operation was established to support the Italian authorities in tackling maritime illegal migration on the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria and the Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, Lampione).

      In January 2013, there was only one incident reported under JO Hermes whereby a total of 35 irregular migrants were detected, 32 of which were Syrian and three were Egyptian. [***] The disembarkation point was near Syracuse but this time the interception took place inland, implying that the facilitators (and probably some migrants) evaded detection.

      The absence of boats from Tunisia and Libya may be due to the bad weather conditions throughout the Mediterranean area.

      Although FRAN data suggest that detections of migrants from Syria were low in this region during the first three months of 2013 (85), there were some reports of boats arriving directly from Syria.

    [***]
    4.2.3 Western Mediterranean Route

    • In Q1 2013 there were only around 1 000 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where three-quarters of all detections were reported. At the end of 2012 we reported vastly increased detections of migrants from Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Guinea arriving in the region of Cadiz but this did not continue into the first few months of 2013.

      Analysing the nationalities detected on this route is problematic as half were reported by the Spanish authorities as being of unknown nationality. However, open sources suggest that there have been increased reports of African migrants storming the border fence in Melilla.

    [***]
    4.2.4 Western African Route

    • In the first quarter of 2013, there were just a few individual detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, which is the same level as during the same period in 2012. During the previous quarter there were 30 or so detections of both Gambians and Moroccans but neither of these nationalities were apparent in the data exchanged for the first three months of 2013. Hence irregular migration pressure on the Western African route in much reduced.

      ————

      Click here for a copy of the report.

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by | 06 Oct 2013 · 23:22

Chappatte on the latest disaster at Lampedusa

© Chappatte - www.globecartoon.com - Used by Migrants At Sea with permission.

© Chappatte – http://www.globecartoon.com – Used by Migrants At Sea with permission.

© Chappatte - www.globecartoon.com - Used by Migrants At Sea with permission.

© Chappatte – http://www.globecartoon.com – Used by Migrants At Sea with permission.

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by | 05 Oct 2013 · 04:21

Frontex Periodic Update on the Central Mediterranean

As it does periodically, Frontex yesterday released a short update regarding the “Central Mediterranean Route.” The timing of its release presumably had nothing to do with the October 3rd disaster at Lampedusa.  The update makes no reference to deaths or injuries and focuses on illegal border crossing statistics.  (The collection and release of data by Frontex in regard to deaths and injuries would facilitate greater transparency in regard to its border control activities.)

From the update: “Between January and September 2013, more than 31 000 migrants had arrived in the EU using [the Central Mediterranean] route, mainly via Sicily and Lampedusa, but also, to a lesser extent, on the Coasts of Calabria, Puglia and Malta, which is also under increasing migratory pressure. The main nationalities include Eritreans, Somalis and other sub-Saharan Africans, as well as Syrian nationals. It is noteworthy that the migratory pressure over the summer months of 2013 was comparable to the same period in 2011.”

Click here for Update.

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by | 04 Oct 2013 · 05:54

Lampedusa – 300 or more dead in latest accident, what can be done to stop migrant deaths at sea?

Italian authorities have so far recovered about 120 bodies from yesterday’s accident a very very short distance from the shores of Lampedusa. Authorities believe there may be more than 150 bodies of children, women, and men still to be recovered.

What can be done to prevent such deaths? It is certainly possible that nothing could have prevented yesterday’s disaster.  This was not a case of a disabled boat left to drift at sea while ships and aircraft failed to assist.  This was not a case involving a failure to act promptly to rescue persons in distress.  This was not a case of a diplomatic dispute between countries over which country had the responsibility to rescue and where rescued persons were to be disembarked after rescue.  It may turn out to be the case that someone observed the overloaded migrant boat as it sailed from Libya towards Lampedusa.  If the migrant boat was observed by a commercial or military ship, a rescue operation probably should have been implemented immediately.  But while the Mediterranean Sea is crowded with ships, it is certainly possible that this boat sailed unobserved from Libya to Lampedusa.

Could anything have been done to prevent these deaths?

Could anything have been done to prevent the deaths of 13 migrants who drowned on the beach at Sicily last week? Or the 31 people who drowned off the Libyan coast in July? Or the 20 who died near Lesvos Island in Greece last December, the 89 who died in the Strait of Gibraltar over 10 days in October-November 2012, or the 58 who died off the coast of Izmir, Turkey in September 2012?  (For a more complete list of reported deaths at sea consult Fortress Europe’s La Strage web page (the Massacre).)

As long as people move, whether forced to flee danger or to improve their lives or for other reasons, there will be dangers on land and sea.  The dangers will always be greater when people are compelled to move outside of legal channels. Creating more opportunities for legal migration and creating an external procedure for seeking refugee protection within the EU would help many people and would reduce the numbers of people traveling by dangerous means.  But there will still be people unable to secure a visa or protection who would be compelled to travel by sea. 

There are many measures that can be taken by the EU to reduce the numbers of people dying in the Mediterranean and off the coast of western Africa.  As a reminder, here is an excerpt from the recommendations issued last year by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in the report issued in the aftermath of the deaths of 63 people on board the “left to die” boat that drifted in the Mediterranean for two weeks. The recommendations made sense then as they do now:

  •  fill the vacuum of responsibility for an SAR zone left by a State which cannot or does not exercise its responsibility for search and rescue, such as was the case for Libya. This may require amending the International Maritime Search and Rescue Convention (SAR Convention)….;
  • ensure that there are clear and simple guidelines, which are then followed, on what amounts to a distress signal, so as to avoid any confusion over the obligation to launch a search and rescue operation for a boat in distress;
  • avoid differing interpretations of what constitutes a vessel in distress, in particular as concerns overloaded, unseaworthy boats, even if under propulsion, and render appropriate assistance to such vessels. Whenever safety requires that a vessel be assisted, this should lead to rescue actions;
  • tackle the reasons why commercial vessels fail to go to the rescue of boats in distress. This will require dealing with:
    • the economic consequences for the rescuing vessel and its owners, and the issue of compensation;
    • the disagreement between Malta and Italy as to whether disembarkation should be to the nearest safe port or to a port within the country of the SAR zone. The International Maritime Organization should be urged to find a solution to the matter and step up its efforts towards a harmonised interpretation and application of international maritime law;
    • the fear of criminalisation (trafficking or aiding and abetting irregular migration) by those who go to the rescue of boats carrying irregular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees;
    • legislation to criminalise private shipmasters who fail to comply with their duty under the law of the sea, as is already the case in certain Council of Europe member States;
  • ensure that, in accordance with the Hirsi v. Italy judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, after the rescue operation, people are not pushed back to a country where they risk being treated in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
  • tackle the issue of responsibility sharing, particularly in the context of rescue services, disembarkation, administration of asylum requests, setting up reception facilities and relocation and resettlement, with a view to developing a binding European Union protocol for the Mediterranean region. The heavy burden placed on frontline States leads to a problem of saturation and a reluctance to take responsibility;
  • respect the families’ right to know the fate of those who lose their lives at sea by improving identity data collection and sharing. This could include the setting up of a DNA file of the remains of those retrieved from the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, the ongoing work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organisations should be acknowledged and supported.

For more on this, see Jack Shenker’s article in today’s Guardian, “Mediterranean migrant deaths: a litany of largely avoidable loss.”

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by | 26 Aug 2013 · 06:20

Frontex FRAN Report for Q4 2012

This summary is a follow-up to our previous post, which discussed the Frontex FRAN third quarter report for 2012. In May of this year, Frontex released its report for the fourth quarter (October – December) of 2012. (Frontex has since released its Report for Q1 2013; we will post a summary of this recent Report shortly.) During the fourth quarter 2012 several FRAN indicators varied radically compared with other reporting periods. First, there were only 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level- the lowest ever recorded figure for any quarter since data collection began in 2008. And for the first time since 2010, there were more detections at the sea borders (59%) , primarily in the Central Mediterranean, than at the land borders.  In contrast to the reduction in overall detections of illegal border-crossing, both clandestine entries and asylum applications reached their highest levels by far, with Syrians ranking first among nationalities. Notably, Syrians submitted more asylum claims than any other nationality in this single quarter since data collection began.

Here are some highlights from the Report focusing on the sea borders:

  • There were 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is the lowest ever recorded figure since data collection began in early 2008.
  • For the first time since 2010 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the external sea border (59%) than at the land border, which reflects the increasing importance of the Central Mediterranean route, and increased detections in the Aegean Sea in response to Greek operational activity at the land border with Turkey.
  • The [five] border sections reporting the most detections in Q4 2012 were:
  1. the Italian Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa), where there were increased arrivals of Eritreans and Somalis;
  2. the Greek Aegean Sea, to where Afghans and Syrians were increasingly displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey;
  3. the Greek land border with Albania with a significant trend of Albanian circular migrants, now ranking second at the EU level;
  4. the Spanish land border with Morocco, where there was a steady trend of unknown nationalities (probably sub-Saharans)and Algerians;
  5. the Bulgarian land border with Turkey, to where Palestinians and Syrians were increasingly displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey.
  • More detections were reported by Italy than any other Member State, and more were reported from the Italian Pelagic Islands than any other border section. Somalis continued to arrive in Lampedusa in increasing numbers, but this development was overshadowed by a massive increase in the number of Eritreans arriving in Lampedusa and Malta from October onwards.
  • In Q4 2012 there was an overall decline in the number of migrants arriving in the [Central Mediterranean] region mostly due to fewer North African nationalities such as Tunisians and Egyptians. However, there was a surge of migrants from sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea, the Gambia and Mali, all of which were detected in much higher numbers than during the previous quarter – hence opposing seasonal declines expected at this time of year and observed for many other nationalities.
  • In accordance with the ‘Processo Verbale’ of 5 April 2011 (an agreement between Italy and Tunisia on cooperation in the field of migration policy) in November and December 2012, Tunisian nationals were returned to Tunis or were recovered by the Tunisian authorities in international waters.
  • [In the Central Mediterranean,] [i]n contrast to decreased detections of migrants from North Africa, there were significant increases compared to the previous quarter, in detections of migrants from several sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea (+200%), the Gambia (+90%) and Mali (+350%), as well as a steady and significant flow of migrants from Somalia, now ranked second in the region behind Eritreans.
  • [T]he situation of the migration management by the Libyan authorities remains critical, both on land and at sea.
  • There are still reports about extreme violence against black African nationals in Libya. Most of the migrants reported to have been beaten by Libyan police after being arrested and also by members of the facilitation networks.
  • In Q4 2012 there were nearly 1 900 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where almost exactly half of all detections were reported. Going into the final quarter of the year there were vastly increased detections of migrants from Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Guinea arriving in the region of Cadiz.
  • Asylum applications were at by far their highest level since data collection began in early 2008, with Syrians ranking first among nationalities, followed by Afghans.

Here are excerpts from the Report focusing on the sea borders:

4.1 Detections of Illegal Border-crossing

“Overall in Q4 2012 there were 13 613 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which was the lowest figure since data collection began in early 2008. The low number of detections compared to other quarters was due to vastly increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where in recent years the majority of migrants were detected (operation Aspida, see next section). Reduced detections were also in part due to the overlapping effects of the end of the Arab Spring in its initial countries (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) and far fewer detections of Albanian circular migrants detected illegally crossing the land border into Greece.

For the first time since 2010 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the external sea border (59%) than at the land border, which reflects the increasing importance of the Central Mediterranean route, and increased detections in the Aegean Sea in response to Greek operational activity at the land border with Turkey. …

Figure 2 FRAN Report Q4 2012[***]

More detections were reported by Italy than any other Member State, and more were reported from the Italian Pelagic Islands than any other border section. Somalis continued to arrive in Lampedusa in increasing numbers, but this development was overshadowed by a massive increase in the number of Eritreans arriving in Lampedusa and Malta from October onwards.

[***]

In Q4 2012, most (nine) Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period of the previous year, albeit from relatively low bases (Fig. 3). For example, detections in Malta rose sevenfold, from Q4 2011 to Q4 2012, mostly due to increased detections of Eritreans, who also played a major role in doubling the number of detections in Italy compared to a year previously….

[***]

During the final quarter of 2012, the nationality with the fastest growing number of detections of illegal border-crossing in terms of absolute increase was Eritreans: up almost threefold from 352 in Q4 2011 to nearly 1 300 in the current reporting period. Detections of migrants from Mali increased more sharply but from a lower base: from 37 to 379 over the same period. In both cases, these migrants were almost exclusively detected in Lampedusa having left on small fishing boats from Libya.

[***]

4.2 Routes

[D]uring the final quarter of 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing on the three main irregular migration routes converged to very similar levels with only 2 000 detections separating the three main routes.”

Fran Q4 Eastern Med.4.2.1 Eastern Mediterranean Route

[***]

In recent quarters the most commonly detected have been migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria and, more recently, Syria. In Q4 2012 the most commonly detected migrants in this region were from Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine but all in much reduced numbers than previously reported….

[***]

Italian Ionian Coast – For some time there has been a steady flow of Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving at the southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia, with some very large increases during Q3 2012. Apparently, many of them had been previously resident in Greece for several years, while some Afghan nationals claimed to have worked in Pakistan for six years, but due to the bad social and working conditions decided to return to Afghanistan and then to move to Europe to improve their economic situation.

In contrast, in Q4 2012 other nationalities, such as Syrian, Bangladeshi and Egyptian, responded to the seasonal weather changes and were correspondingly detected in much lower numbers than during the previous quarter.

The JO Aeneas 2012 in Apulia and Calabria started on 2 July and was extended until 2 January 2013. Overall, the percentage of incidents Screen Shot 2013-06-19 at 4.03.07 PMwhich involved departures from Greece was as high as 78% (Fig. 7). According to operational reports, the decrease in the number of arrivals in Apulia and Calabria from August 2012 was due the implementation of the Greek police operation Aspida stemming the flow of migrants. However, adding to the flow were Greek police operations against irregular migration in the centre of Athens and in other cities of Greece which continued to push irregular migrants out of Greece….

[***]

4.2.2 Central Mediterranean Route

According to FRAN data, in Q4 2012 there were 3,476 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta), almost exactly the same number as in the previous quarter and significantly higher than any other quarter both before and after the Arab Spring. However, this figure concealed seasonal decreases for some commonly nationalities and significant increases for others.

[***]

In accordance with the ‘Processo Verbale’ of 5 April 2011 (an agreement between Italy and Tunisia on cooperation in the field of migration policy) in November and December 2012, Tunisian nationals were returned to Tunis or were recovered by the Tunisian authorities in international waters. In 2012, Italian authorities delivered two patrol boats to the Tunisian authorities in order to improve the fight against the trafficking of human beings and irregular immigration. Consistent with declining numbers of Tunisians, detections of Egyptian migrants arriving in the Central Mediterranean region also fell, in this case from 287 in Q3 to just 135 in Q4 2012.

In contrast to decreased detections of migrants from North Africa, there were significant increases compared to the previous quarter, in detections of migrants from several sub-Saharan countries such as Eritrea (+200%), the Gambia (+90%) and Mali (+350%), as well as a steady and significant flow of migrants from Somalia, now ranked second in the region behind Eritreans. Most of these migrants departed from Libya, where, due to a paucity of ground vehicles and boats, low technical and professional levels of the new police forces, the situation of the migration management by the Libyan authorities remains critical, both on land and at sea (Fig. 9).

[****]

There was also a very large increase in the number of Syrians detected in the Central Mediterranean region from just five in Q3 to nearly 100 in Q4 2012, which is consistent with widespread increased detections of this nationality across border sections. However, there is currently no evidence to suggest that the Central Mediterranean area is likely to become the main point of entry for Syrian migrants.

[***]

There are still reports about extreme violence against black African nationals in Libya. Most of the migrants reported to have been beaten by Libyan police after being arrested and also by members of the facilitation networks. The big Somali community in Abu Slim/Tripoli is the main gathering point for migrants originating from the Horn of Africa. From there, a second destination close to the beach is the final stopover before embarking the boats for the crossing to Italy. Some migrants reported that they got afraid when seeing the relatively small rubber dinghies and refused to enter them. Armed guards beat them and forced them to board the boats, not letting anyone leave.

4.2.3 Western Mediterranean Route

In Q4 2012 there were nearly 1,900 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where almost exactly half of all detections were reported. Going into the final quarter of the year there were vastly increased detections of migrants from Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Guinea arriving in the region of Cadiz.

As has been the case for several years, the most commonly detected migrants were from Algeria, followed by migrants of unknown nationality (presumed to be sub-Saharan Africans), both of which were mostly reported from the land borders with Morocco.

[****]

The JO Indalo 2012 started in this region on 16 May and ran until 31 October 2012 covering five zones of the south-eastern Spanish sea border and extending into the western Mediterranean. Consistent with previous years, the operational area of the JO Indalo continued to be affected by migratory flows mainly originating from North African and sub-Saharan countries, which follow a similar seasonal pattern. Overall there was a 4% decrease in the number of irregular migrants detected compared to the JO Indalo 2011.

There were almost equal numbers of irregular migrants claiming to be from North African countries and the sub-Saharan region. According to the operational data, sub-Saharan migrants claimed to originate mostly from Chad, Guinea Conakry and Mali, whilst most of the migrants from North African countries claimed to be from Algeria and Morocco.

4.2.4 Western African Route

In the final quarter of 2012, there were just 91 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, which is more than double the number reported during the previous quarter and goes against expected seasonal declines at this time of year. This increase was almost entirely due to migrants from the Gambia, who arrived in the Canary Islands in December significantly adding to the consistent but relatively low flow of Moroccans arriving in this area.

Despite the arrivals of Gambians, the total number of 91 detections was still lower than during the same period in 2011 (i.e. 112, almost exclusively Moroccans). The high level of cooperation between the Spanish, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities performing joint patrols at sea and on the coastline of these countries has been a significant deterrent factor to prevent irregular migration flows from Senegal and Mauritania towards the Canary Islands.”

Moroccan migrants were mainly young, lower-class, Arabic-speaking males who were undocumented to avoid repatriation. They arrived mainly in migrant boats targeting the Canary Islands.

[***]”

—————

Click here or here for FRAN Q4 2012 Report.

For previous 2012 FRAN Report summaries, click here (Q2) and here (Q3).

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