Category Archives: France

EU Mediterranean States Oppose Provisions of Proposed Frontex Sea Borders Regulation Relating to Rescue and Disembarkation

[16 Oct. UPDATE: The document from the six states opposing the proposed Regulation is available here.]

One week ago Commissioner Cecilia Malmström called for an “extensive Frontex search and rescue operation that would cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain.” Yesterday the ANSA news service reported that all six EU Mediterranean states (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, France and Spain) have voiced opposition to the proposed Frontex Sea Borders Regulation (COM(2013) 197 final) and specifically to Articles 9 and 10 relating to “Search and Rescue Situations” and “Disembarkation.” ANSA reported that the six member states “expressed disapproval of the draft and called it ‘unacceptable for practical and legal reasons’.”  The six countries have reportedly taken the position that there is no need for further regulations pertaining to rescue at sea or post-rescue places of disembarkation since other international laws already “deal ‘amply’ with the matters.”

As you may recall, the earlier version of the Frontex Sea Borders Rule in the form of a Decision was adopted by the European Council in 2010 (Decision 2010/252/EU).  The Decision was subsequently annulled by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the ground that it introduced new essential elements into the Schengen Borders Code by way of the provisions on interception, rescue and disembarkation and that such substantive changes required the consideration and approval of the European Parliament. (European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Case C-355/10, 5 Sept. 2012). The proposed replacement for the annulled Decision is in the form of a Regulation but is fairly similar in content.

While the ANSA report does not identify the specific reasons why the six states are opposing the proposal, one can speculate that the objections to Art. 9, Search and Rescue Situations, may be based on a perception that it would expand the obligation to rescue under certain circumstances.  For example the Article requires that even in the absence of a distress call, a rescue operation might still be required if other factors are present, including:

  • the seaworthiness of the ship and the likelihood that the ship will not reach its final destination;
  • the number of passengers in relation to the type and condition of the ship;
  • the availability of necessary supplies such as fuel, water, food to reach a shore;
  • the presence of passengers in urgent need of medical assistance;
  • the presence of deceased passengers;
  • the presence of pregnant women or children.

The objections by the six states to Art. 10 regarding places of disembarkation are most likely due to the states’ conflicting positions regarding where disembarkation should occur.  While Art. 10 creates a procedure for decisions regarding places of disembarkation to be made by participating member states in advance of joint operations, its provisions identify circumstances under which disembarkation in member state may occur when that state is not participating in the joint operation.  Malta and Italy in particular have long disagreed on where disembarkations are to occur.  This long standing disagreement obviously contradicts the claims made by the six opposing states that existing international laws already deal “amply” with the disembarkation issue.

Click here for ANSA article.

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Deaths at Sea at Europe’s Other Southern Border – Mayotte

Five persons, including three children, are confirmed dead, and at least 15 are missing and presumed dead after a small boat (known locally as a “kwassa-kwassa”) sank off of the French island of Mayotte on 19 May.  19 people were rescued.  The boat sank after striking a coral reef.  The boat was attempting a 100 km voyage from the island of Anjouan in the Union of the Comoros to the French island of Mayotte.  Approximately 200 people each year are believed to die attempting to make the 100 km voyage from the Comoros to Mayotte.

Mayotte, which is located off the coast of Mozambique and is geographically part of the Comoros Islands, became an Overseas Department of France in March 2011.  The French government estimates that 40% of Mayotte’s population is without legal immigration status.  According to a Reuters article, in 2011, “there were some 1200 applications for asylum in Mayotte, 41 per cent more than in 2010. The largest proportion of applicants came from the Union of the Comoros (90 per cent), with citizens from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Rwanda and Burundi, accounting for the rest. Last year some 20,000 people, including failed asylum seekers, were sent back from Mayotte to the Union of the Comoros and Madagascar.”

Click here (EN), here (FR), here (FR), here (FR) and here (FR) for articles.

Click here for statement from La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme: “A Mayotte, ce n’est pas la mer qui tue, c’est la politique” (FR)

Capture from Google Maps.

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[UPDATED- Link to Complaint] Press Conference to Announce Filing of Legal Complaint Against French Army for Failure to Assist Migrant Boat (Paris, 11 April)

FIDH, GISTI, and Migreurop are holding a press conference at 11:00 AM on Wednesday, 11 April, to announce the filing of a legal complaint against the French military with the Procureur de la République du Tribunal de grande instance de Paris alleging that military forces failed to render assistance to the migrant boat that drifted for days one year ago within the NATO military zone off the Libyan coast.  63 persons ultimately died.

Press Conference details:

“mercredi 11 avril à 11H00, dans les locaux de la FIDH, 17, passage de la Main d’or – Paris 75011

en présence de:

  • – Stéphane Maugendre, président de GISTI
  • – Patrick Baudouin, président d’Honneur de la FIDH
  • – Jacques Montacié, LDH
  • – Charles Heller, chercheur à Goldsmiths, University of London
  • – Père Mussie Zerai, président de l’Agenzia Habeshia

Un an après la mort de 63 migrants dans un bateau au large de la Libye, des survivants, avec le soutien d’une coalition d’ONG déposeront, mercredi 11 avril, devant le auprès du Procureur de la République du Tribunal de grande instance de Paris , une plainte mettant en cause l’armée française pour non assistance à personne en danger. Cette conférence de presse sera l’occasion de revenir en détails sur les événements de ce périple cauchemardesque et d’expliquer pourquoi notre coalition estime que certains militaires français devraient en l’espèce voir leur responsabilité pénale engagée.

Contacts presse: FIDH: Arthur Manet – Tel: +33 6 72 28 42 94; GISTI: Stéphane Maugendre – Tel: +33 6 07 37 90 72”

UPDATE: Click here or on this link, La plainte contre-armee-francaise 11avril2012, for copy of the Complaint.  (FR)

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Statewatch Analysis: The Arab Spring and the death toll in the Mediterranean: the true face of Fortress Europe

Statewatch released an Analysis by Marie Martin entitled “The Arab Spring and the death toll in the Mediterranean: the true face of Fortress Europe.”

Excerpt: “Throughout the uprisings in North Africa, the EU has maintained a discourse of double standards: supporting calls for freedom and democracy but greeting resulting population displacement with hostility. This has contributed to a record number of people dying at Europe’s borders during the first seven months of 2011. It is all about numbers when it comes to migration; about how large a flow came in, how many people asked for protection and how many applicants were “failed” or “rejected.” Numbers quantify the “threat” (e.g. the “invasion” of irregular migrants) and serve as a bargaining tool with third countries (allowing the acceptance of the externalisation of border controls in exchange for facilitating the mobility of a specific number of nationals). Numbers demonstrate whether the target of “x” thousands of annual deportations of irregular migrants is met. Numbers released by public authorities are meant to justify the need for migration policies and to show how efficiently they are implemented. Yet hidden numbers question the legitimacy of these policies – the death toll of people dying at Europe’s borders is such an example. For several years, Gabriele del Grande has monitored the situation at the EU’s external borders and kept a record of the number of deaths occurring in the context of irregular bordercrossings [2] on the Fortress Europe website. According to the website’s latest update, the EU’s borders have never been so “murderous” [3]: there were 1,931 deaths during the first seven months of 2011. [4] In 2008, a petition was brought before the European Parliament by the ProAsyl organisation, denouncing the  deathtrap at the EU’s borders” [5]: it was a particularly “murderous” year, with 1,500 deaths. It is terrifying to realise that this toll was exceeded in the first seven months of 2011. …”

Click here for Analysis.

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Transatlantic Trends: Immigration Survey 2011 / US and European Public Opinion

Transatlantic Trends has released a public opinion survey: “The results of the 2011 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey captures U.S. and European public opinion on a range of immigration and integration issues.  The most important highlights of this year’s survey show

  • 1) there is a remarkable stability of general immigration opinions over time,
  • 2) the public supports European Union burden-sharing on migration resulting from the Arab Spring and increasingly favors European responsibility for setting immigrant admissions numbers, and
  • 3) the public tends to favor highly educated immigrants but still prefers immigrants with a job offer.

Now in its fourth year, Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) measures public opinion on immigration and integration issues on both sides of the Atlantic. The countries included in the 2011 version of the survey were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain…. [***]

Key Findings of the Survey – General Perceptions – Stability in Public Opinion: Basic public stances on immigration have not changed notably in the last year, even in Europe where the perceived threat of movement resulting from the Arab Spring was a central issue. Immigration remained a second order concern for the public, following the economy and unemployment. Perceptions of immigration as a problem or opportunity have changed little since 2008, the first year of the survey. In 2011, 52% of Europeans and 53% of Americans polled saw immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity, with the strongest pessimism in the United Kingdom (68%)…. [***]

Forced Migration, the Arab Spring, and Burden-sharing – Sympathy for Forced Migration for Various Reasons. The public was sympathetic to the plight of migrants forced to flee their homes for a number of reasons: to avoid persecution, armed conflict, and natural disaster. Fewer but still a majority of respondents were also in favor of accepting migrants seeking to avoid poverty. Respondents in Spain (76%), Italy (68%), and the United States (64%) were the most supportive of those fleeing poor economic conditions, compared to a European average of 58%.

Key Findings of the Survey – Forced Migration, the Arab Spring, and Burden-Sharing – Dealing with the Arab Spring:  Europeans in general were very open to helping countries in North Africa and the Middle East experiencing the turmoil and aftermath of the Arab Spring with either trade (84% in favor) or development aid (79% in favor), though they were wary of opening their labor markets to migrants from the region (47% in favor) and would prefer that migrants who were admitted stay only temporarily. Eighty percent of European respondents supported European burden-sharing to cope with the flows emanating from the region….[***]”

Click here for TTI Key Findings statement.

Click here for TTI Report.

Click here for TTI Topline Data.

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Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano: La crisis en el Norte de África y su impacto en la inmigración irregular a la Unión Europea (by Frontex Dep. ED Gil Arias)

Real Instituto Elcano has published an analysis regarding the situation in North Africa and its impact on irregular immigration to the EU.  The analysis was written by Frontex’s Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias.

Of particular interest is the analysis regarding what Frontex believes might occur in regard to migrant flows from Libya under two different scenarios: Gadafi remaining in power or ultimately being removed from power (see Google translation of excerpt below):

“… En el caso de que el régimen de Gadafi recupere el control, la UE y sus Estados Miembros no podrán reanudar la cooperación con un régimen totalmente desacreditado. Se producirá el cese en la aplicación de acuerdos de cooperación policial que en el pasado (desde mayo de 2009) sirvieron para detener los flujos de inmigración irregular desde Libia hacia Italia y Malta. La posibilidad de que ciudadanos de otros países africanos bloqueados en Libia sean obligados o “ayudados” a emigrar a la UE no debe descartarse. De hecho, Gadafi ha amenazado con “abrir la puerta” de la inmigración ilegal hacia Europa.

La OIM estima la cifra de extranjeros presentes en Libia entre 0,5 y 1,5 millones. No obstante, no todos serian candidatos a la inmigración ilegal. Se trata fundamentalmente de trabajadores empleados por empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país, por lo que su intención primaria no sería la emigración a la UE y por otra parte una buena parte de ellos ya han abandonado Libia.

En el peor de los casos, la consecuencia de ese “abrir la puerta” sería la reactivación de los flujos por vía marítima hacia Lampedusa y Malta (eventualmente también Creta, que se encuentra a 200 km de distancia de la costa libia) en un escenario similar al de 2008 (40.000 inmigrantes llegaron a Italia y Malta, con origen en las costas libias) agravado por el efecto adicional de la inestabilidad en el país. Su destino principal serían los países con presencia importante de ciudadanos norteafricanos (Italia, Francia, España, Bélgica y el Reino Unido). El destino de los nacionales de países subsaharianos se encontraría más repartido por toda la UE.

Si Gadafi es derrocado resultará clave la capacidad y rapidez de la oposición para reorganizarse. La oposición se encuentra, por el momento, bastante desorganizada y es probable que se produzcan luchas internas por el poder, especialmente por el control de los campos petrolíferos. Ello podría conducir a un estado persistente de disturbios y a una ausencia de control por un largo periodo de tiempo.

La eventual reactivación de las rutas migratorias hacia la UE dependerá de la capacidad del nuevo régimen para imponer la ley y el orden en el país así como el control efectivo sobre los 2.000 km de costas y 4.000 km de fronteras terrestres libias. En el peor de los escenarios podría darse una situación similar a la de Somalia.

En este escenario, la economía libia puede deteriorarse y elevarse los niveles de desempleo. Actualmente se desconoce la tasa de desempleo en Libia, pero se presume baja. Previsiblemente, la mayoría de los trabajadores desempleados intentará regresar a sus países, pero parte de ellos (sobre todo los nacionales de países inseguros) buscaran otras oportunidades, entre ellas la emigración clandestina a la UE.

La ausencia de ley y orden, especialmente la ausencia de control sobre las fronteras marítimas, llevará rápidamente a las mafias al tráfico de inmigrantes hacia la UE. Los candidatos serían primariamente trabajadores desempleados no deseosos de volver a sus países (mayormente de África Occidental y Oriental, pero eventualmente también libios, egipcios, argelinos y tunecinos). Esta situación impediría, por otra parte, el retorno de quienes fuesen detectados cruzando ilegalmente las fronteras exteriores de la UE.

En tales circunstancias se puede prever un flujo constante de inmigración ilegal durante meses, mayoritariamente por vía marítima, pero también por vía aérea a través de Turquía. La duración en el tiempo de este escenario dependerá de la rapidez con la que la UE o los Estados Miembros y las nuevas autoridades sean capaces de restablecer la cooperación. En este sentido, serán determinantes los acuerdos de readmisión efectivos.

Por último, ha de tenerse también en cuenta el riesgo marginal de que los vencedores realicen acciones de persecución sobre los partidarios de Gadafi, lo que provocaría la huida de éstos del país en busca de refugio….”

Google translation of the above excerpts (NB – this is only a rough translation):

“…In the case of Qaddafi’s regime  regaining control, the EU and its Member States shall not resume cooperation with a discredited regime. Termination will occur in the implementation of agreements on police cooperation in the past (May 2009) served to stop the flow of illegal immigration from Libya to Italy and Malta. The possibility for citizens from other African countries locked in Libya are forced or “helped” to migrate to the EU can not be ruled out. In fact, Gaddafi has threatened to “open the door” of illegal immigration into Europe.

The IOM estimates the number of foreigners in Libya between 0.5 and 1.5 million. However, not all candidates would be illegal immigration. These are mainly employed by foreign companies settled in the country, so that their primary intention would not be the migration to the EU and, moreover, a good portion of them have already left Libya.

In the worst case, the consequence of this “open door” would be the reactivation of the flows by sea to Lampedusa and Malta (and possibly Crete, which is 200 km away from the Libyan coast) in a scenario similar to that of 2008 (40.000 immigrants arrived in Italy and Malta, departing from the Libyan coast) aggravated by the additional effect of instability in the country. Its main destination countries would be a significant presence of North African citizens (Italy, France, Spain, Belgium and the UK). The fate of the national sub-Saharan countries would be more distributed throughout the EU.

If Gadhafi is overthrown will be key capacity and speed of the opposition to regroup. The opposition is, at present, quite disorganized and is likely to produce internal power struggles, especially for control of the oilfields. This could lead to a persistent state of unrest and a lack of control over a long period of time.

The eventual recovery of migratory routes towards the EU depends on the ability of the new regime to impose law and order in the country as well as effective control over the 2,000 km of coastline and 4,000 km of land borders Libya. In the worst case scenario could be a situation similar to Somalia.

In this scenario, the Libyan economy may deteriorate and unemployment levels rise. Currently unknown unemployment rate in Libya, but presumably low. Predictably, most unemployed workers try to return to their countries, but some of them (especially insecure country nationals) to seek other opportunities, including illegal migration to the EU.

The absence of law and order, especially the lack of control over maritime borders, whisk the trafficking mafias immigrants into the EU. Candidates would be primarily unemployed workers eager to return to their countries (mostly from West and East Africa, but also possibly Libyans, Egyptians, Algerians and Tunisians). This would prevent, on the other hand, the return of those who were detected illegally crossing the external borders of the EU.

In such circumstances, can provide a steady flow of illegal immigration for months, mostly by sea, but also by air through Turkey. The long life of this scenario depends on the speed with which the EU or the Member States and the new authorities are able to restore cooperation. In this regard, will determine the effective readmission agreements.

Finally, it must also take into account the marginal risk that the winners perform acts of persecution on Gaddafi’s supporters, causing them to flee the country in search of refuge….”

Click here for the Analysis. (ES)

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Retour des Contrôles Dans L’espace Schengen (by Chappatte)

© Chappatte - http://www.globecartoon.com - Used by Migrants At Sea with permission.

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Follow-Up Report and Analysis Regarding Failure to Rescue Disabled Migrant Boat Resulting in 61 Deaths

UNHCR today released more information from three Ethiopian survivors of the migrant boat that left Tripoli on 25 March with 72 passengers and which, after becoming disabled and running out of food and water, washed ashore in Libya over two weeks later with only nine survivors.

Additionally, the Bruxelles2 blog in a recent post, “Un navire de réfugiés non secouru ? Retour sur un drame non élucidé,” has provided detailed analysis regarding the possible identities of the helicopter and warships that failed to render assistance to the migrant boat after it had become disabled.  (See more on this below.)

From UNHCR’s statement:

“[One surviving] refugee said that military vessels twice passed their boat without stopping, and that a military helicopter dropped food and water onto the boat at some point during the journey. The first boat refused their request to board. The second only took photos, he said. The man was not able to identify where the vessels came from.

UNHCR staff met with the three in Shousha camp in Tunisia. One spoke Arabic, while the others spoke Oromo. UNHCR interviewed the Arabic speaker. He said that they paid smugglers US$800 to make the journey. The passengers were expected to operate the boat on their own.

According to the refugee, when water ran out people drank sea water and their own urine. They ate toothpaste. One by one people started to die. He said that they waited for a day or two before dropping the bodies into the sea. There were 20 women and two small children on board. A woman with a two-year-old boy died three days before he died. The refugee described the anguish of the boy after his mother’s death.

After arrival on a beach near Zliten, between Tripoli and the Tunisian border, a woman died on the beach from exhaustion. The remaining 10 men walked to the town of Zliten where they were arrested by the Libyan police. They were taken to a hospital and then to a prison where they were given some water, milk and dates. After two days another survivor died.

After begging jail staff to take the remaining survivors back to hospital, they were taken to a hospital in al-Khums city. Doctors and nurses were said to have given the group water and told them to leave. They were returned to the prison and then taken to Twesha jail near Tripoli. Finally Ethiopian friends in Tripoli paid the prison US$900 to release the men. UNHCR is now providing them with assistance in Tunisia.”

Bruxelles2 notes that the survivors’ reports that the helicopter that dropped supplies had an “Army” marking on it would tend to suggest that the helicopter did not belong to France (“Marine”), Italy (“Marina”), the U.S. Navy (“Navy”), or the Royal Navy (“UK Navy”).  Bruxelles2 believes it is plausible that an “army” helicopter belonging to the US or UK could have been operating in the area, but US Army helicopters tend to be marked “United States.”  According to Bruxelles2 some British army helicopters do carry the “Army” marking.  (One other possibility I would note is that the survivors could simply be mistaken about the marking – they recall clearly that a military helicopter hovered over them and dropped supplies, but incorrectly remember, misread, or assumed that the marking on the side of the helicopter said “Army”.)

Bruxelles2 also suggests that there are other warships that might appear to be an aircraft carrier, especially when viewed from a small migrant boat.  Bruxelles2 points in particular to “the USS Kearsarge (LHD3), [an] amphibious ship [that] regularly hosts (and welcomed during the operations – which the U.S. Navy confirms) AV-8B Harrier vertical takeoff [aircraft].”

Bruxelles2 also notes that the time period when the migrant boat was disabled and drifting was a period when there was a shifting of commands for the multiple European and US naval and air forces operating off Libya.  NATO took command of the maritime embargo on 23 March; the no fly zone and the air attacks were initially under the control of an ad hoc coalition (France, UK, USA, Canada, Belgium, Denmark); full command did not shift to NATO until 31 March and even then it took several days for the transfers of command to occur; and some military vessels continued (and continue to this day) to operate under independent national command.

In short, NATO may be fully correct when it says that a vessel under its command during the time period in question did not encounter the disabled migrant boat.  Further investigation into responsibility is needed.

Click here for UNHCR statement.

Click here for Bruxelles2 post. (FR)

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Report: Military Ships Failed to Rescue or Render Aid and 61 Died at Sea

The Guardian on Sunday reported many more details about an incident that began on 25 March when a migrant boat left Libya carrying 72 asylum seekers and which ended 16 days later on 10 April when the disabled vessel washed ashore in Libya with only 11 survivors.  The survivors have described several incidents where military ships and planes ignored their pleas for rescue.  It is clear from the survivors’ descriptions that their disabled vessel was sighted because at one point a military helicopter dropped bottles of water and emergency food rations on the migrant boat.

The UNHCR and Father Mussie Zerai, an Eritrean priest in Rome who runs the refugee rights organisation Habeshia, have called for further investigations into why the boat’s passengers were not rescued.

From the Guardian article: “The Guardian’s investigation into the case of the boat of 72 migrants which set sail from Tripoli on 25 March established that it carried 47 Ethiopians, seven Nigerians, seven Eritreans, six Ghanaians and five Sudanese migrants. Twenty were women and two were small children, one of whom was just one year old. The boat’s Ghanaian captain was aiming for the Italian island of Lampedusa, 180 miles north-west of the Libyan capital, but after 18 hours at sea the small vessel began running into trouble and losing fuel.  Using witness testimony from survivors and other individuals who were in contact with the passengers during its doomed voyage, the Guardian has pieced together what happened next. The account paints a harrowing picture of a group of desperate migrants condemned to death by a combination of bad luck, bureaucracy and the apparent indifference of European military forces who had the opportunity to attempt a rescue….

The Guardian has made extensive inquiries to ascertain the identity of the Nato aircraft carrier, and has concluded that it is likely to have been the French ship Charles de Gaulle, which was operating in the Mediterranean on those dates.  French naval authorities initially denied the carrier was in the region at that time. After being shown news reports which indicated this was untrue, a spokesperson declined to comment.

A spokesman for Nato, which is co-ordinating military action in Libya, said it had not logged any distress signals from the boat and had no records of the incident. ‘Nato units are fully aware of their responsibilities with regard to the international maritime law regarding safety of life at sea,’ said an official. ‘Nato ships will answer all distress calls at sea and always provide help when necessary. Saving lives is a priority for any Nato ships.’”

Click here for full Guardian article.

Click here (IT) for earlier article.

The route of the boat - from guardian.co.uk

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Commission Communication on Migration of 4 May

The European Commission today issued a Communication on Migration (COM(2011) 248 final) in response to the ongoing arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers in Italy and Malta and in response to the calls by Italy and France for changes in the implementation or interpretation of the Schengen Agreement.

France has welcomed the Commission’s Communication: “We note with interest that the Commission is considering establishing a mechanism for the temporary reintroduction of controls on some sections of internal borders in cases of difficulties or failures of a Member State. We also welcome the emphasis on strengthening the operational capacity of Frontex, the prospect of ultimately creating a European border guard that France has repeatedly called for. Finally, we welcome with satisfaction the intention of the Commission to propose a suspension clause of the liberalization of visa abuse.” (“Nous relevons ainsi avec intérêt que la Commission envisage l’établissement d’un mécanisme permettant la réintroduction temporaire des contrôles à certaines sections des frontières intérieures en cas de difficultés ou de défaillances d’un État membre. Nous nous félicitons aussi de l’accent mis sur le renforcement des capacités opérationnelles de FRONTEX, avec la perspective de créer à terme un système européen de garde-frontières que la France a régulièrement appelé de ses vœux. Nous accueillons enfin avec satisfaction l’intention de la Commission de proposer une clause de suspension de la libéralisation des visas en cas d’abus.”)

Excerpts from the Commission’s Communication on Migration:

“[***]

The purpose of this Communication is to set recent and future policy proposals in a framework that takes account of all relevant aspects and allows the EU and its Member States to manage asylum, migration and mobility of third-country nationals in a secure environment.

[***]

The continuously evolving situation in our Southern Neighbourhood requires rapid responses. Building upon the European Council Conclusions of 11 and 25 March, the European Parliament’s Resolution of 5 April1, and, the joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of 8 March, the Commission will present on 24 May a package of proposals to ensure a coherent EU approach in the area of migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries.

However, the need to address this challenging and evolving situation should not lead to a short-term approach limited to border control without taking account of long-term issues.

[***]

The EU should also ensure that it has in place safe and efficient asylum procedures for people in need of protection. Sixty years after the signature of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, it is time for the EU to reaffirm its commitment to offer protection to any persecuted third country national or stateless person arriving on its territory. A Common European Asylum System, offering a high level of protection and reducing the disparities among Member States’ asylum systems, must be completed by 2012, as agreed by the European Council.

[***]

At the same time, as recent events have starkly illustrated, the EU continues to face serious challenges in the development of its migration policy. The vulnerability of some sections of the EU’s external borders is a clear example, notably in the Southern Mediterranean and at the land border between Greece and Turkey. In particular, measures must be taken to prevent large numbers of irregular migrants, often exploited by unscrupulous criminal networks, from arriving in the EU. The EU should accordingly pursue a migration policy based on ensuring that inward migration is effectively managed and ensure that the need for enhanced mobility does not undermine the security of the Union’s external borders. While this Communication naturally focuses on regions of most immediate concern, the EU’s migration policy follows a geographically comprehensive approach.

[***]

However, while the current crisis confirms the need for increased solidarity at the European level and better sharing of responsibility, it must be recognised that the EU is not fully equipped to help those Member States most exposed to massive migratory movements.

[***]

Building on the experience gained so far with the current pilot project on relocation from Malta, the Commission will support an extension of this project in view of the current influx of migrants seeking international protection there, to be implemented in close cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration.

However, the currently available instruments fall short of fulfilling all the needs and providing a comprehensive response. They can only be resorted to in an ad hoc manner, and are entirely dependent on the will of Member States to voluntarily offer assistance – in whatever form – at a given point in time. This in turn exposes the EU to criticism and risks undermining the trust of the citizens in the EU.

The Commission will closely monitor the continuously evolving situation and may decide, if the relevant conditions are met, to trigger the Temporary Protection Directive3 to provide immediate and temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries that are unable to return to their country of origin.

The Commission will make further proposals during 2011 on delivering solidarity in a holistic manner and how concretely such assistance can be delivered. A number of different approaches are currently being studied, with a view to developing alternatives that will allow urgent needs to be responded to in a more rapid and structured fashion. This initiative will build on the appropriate legal basis of the Lisbon Treaty, such as Articles 80 and 78 paragraph 3, and will draw lessons from the situation in Greece, particularly at the land border between Greece and Turkey, and the crisis in the Southern Mediterranean; it will include possible ad hoc measures to be resorted to in case of particular temporary pressure on one or several Member States, as well as more structural means of ensuring solidarity, both financial and in the form of practical cooperation and technical assistance (e.g. via FRONTEX, EASO, joint operations).

[***]

FRONTEX’s role is key in channelling resources to places where the border is under pressure, as shown by the deployment – for the first time ever – of rapid border intervention teams to the Greek-Turkish land border in 2010 and the deployment of the joint naval operation HERMES to support Italy in 2011. FRONTEX’s legal framework needs be updated to allow it to be more effective in terms of its operational capacity to act at the external border. The Commission proposed the necessary changes in February last year5 and it is now urgent, especially in the light of recent events, that the Council and the Parliament approve this proposal before the end of this semester, as called for by the European Council.

[***]

[A] clear system for Schengen governance is needed. Currently the Union still relies on an intergovernmental system of peer reviews to ensure the application of the common rules. The current revision of the Schengen evaluation mechanism should be based on a Community approach with participation of experts from Member States, FRONTEX and lead by the Commission. The proposed mechanism would ensure more transparency and improve the follow-up of shortcomings identified during the experts’ evaluations. The Commission will also issue guidelines to ensure a coherent implementation and interpretation of the Schengen rules.

A mechanism must also be put in place to allow the Union to handle situations where either a Member State is not fulfilling its obligations to control its section of the external border, or where a particular portion of the external border comes under unexpected and heavy pressure due to external events. A coordinated Community-based response by the Union in critical situations would undoubtedly increase trust among Member States. It would also reduce recourse to unilateral initiatives by Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border controls or to intensify police checks in internal border regions which inevitably slow down the crossing of internal borders for everyone. Such a mechanism may therefore need to be introduced, allowing for a decision at the European level defining which Member States would exceptionally reintroduce internal border control and for how long. The mechanism should be used as a last resort in truly critical situations, until other (emergency) measures have been taken to stabilise the situation at the relevant external border section either at European level, in a spirit of solidarity, and/or at national level, to better comply with the common rules. The Commission is exploring the feasibility of introducing such a mechanism, and may present a proposal to this effect shortly.

[***]

One of the main purposes of the Common European Asylum System is to reduce the wide divergence in the outcome of asylum applications lodged in different countries of the EU, and to ensure a common set of procedural and substantive rights which can be relied on across the Union, while ensuring full compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and other relevant international obligations.

In 2010, there were some 257 800 asylum seekers registered in the EU, or 515 applicants per million inhabitants. Ten Member States accounted for more than 90% of applicants registered in the EU17.

It is time to complete the Common European Asylum System by reaching agreement on a balanced package by the 2012 deadline agreed by the European Council in December 2009. To that end, the Commission will shortly put forward modified proposals on the Reception Conditions and the Asylum Procedures Directives. A balanced agreement on the revision of the Dublin Regulation must be reached, including on a last resort emergency mechanism in case of exceptional pressures, and on the revised Eurodac system.

[***]”

Click here for the Communication – COM(2011) 248 final.

Click here for Commission Press Statement and here for Commission FAQs.

Click here for French Government’s Point de Presse.

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MEPs Express Concern Over Possible Changes to Schengen Rules

According to an EP press release, during Monday’s LIBE meeting, MEPs expressed concern over the “Commission’s announcement that it is considering a temporary reintroduction of checks at the EU’s internal borders.”

From the EP press release:

“‘Schengen governance is suffering too much from inter-governmentalism’, said the Commission representative [at the LIBE meeting], adding that the Commission would table a communication on the issue on 4 May. The Commission paper will seek to ‘replace the unilateral re-introduction of border controls by a Community mechanism’. This would enable the Commission temporarily to impose checks at national borders, in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.  [Click on this link [DRAFT 15-04-2011] for a draft version of the Commission Communication on Migration.]

‘The decision would be taken collectively, and not unilaterally as is now the case’, said the Commission representative, pointing out that, at present, Member States’ decisions to restore internal border checks cannot be challenged before the European Court of Justice.

‘Schengen should not be weakened’, said Civil Liberties Committee rapporteur Carlos Coelho (EPP, PT), asking for ‘some precaution’ on this issue….

According to the Commission representative, the 4 May communication, to be unveiled ahead of the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 12 May and of the European Council in June, will provide a long-term perspective for migration policies.

The communication will focus on the management of the Schengen area and propose ways to improve the administration of the visa system. It will also address the common asylum system, which needs to overcome the current impasse in the Council, and the ‘security and mobility partnership’….

‘This is not a Schengen problem, this is a social problem’ to do with migration, said Birgit Sippel (S&D, DE), adding that ‘I am bothered about the timing’ of these requests by Sarkozy and Berlusconi.

The ‘Council is not willing to deal with migration’, added Judith Sargentini (Greens/EFA, NL). Concerning the reintroduction of border controls, she called for a clear definition of ‘temporary’. Franziska Keller (Greens/EFA, DE), asked ‘Which are the specific cases and who decides what is an emergency or not?’…”

Click here for EP press release.

Click on this link [DRAFT 15-04-2011] for draft version of the Commission Communication on Migration.

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Libya Placed Mines Outside Misrata Harbour

The French naval vessel the Courbet stopped several Libyan patrol boats on 29 April that were in the process of attempting to lay mines outside the Misrata harbour.  Three mines were discovered in the waters.  This is a new danger for civilian ships and boats in Libyan waters. (HT to Bruxelles2).

Click here (FR) for French Ministry of Defence statement.

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Malmström: Migration Policy Should Not Be Event Driven

From Commissioner’s Cecilia Malmström blog:

“It’s important to prepare for what’s happening in Northern Africa and to have a long term strategy for the cooperation with our neighbouring countries. There’s however quite worrying tendencies in Member States to be too event-driven and calling for quick-fix measures. It’s important to remember that out of the approx. 25.000 migrants coming to the EU the last couple of months only a few thousands are refugees, seeking asylum in the EU. The others are economical migrants from Tunisia looking for work and a better life in Europe. These people are likely to be sent back to Tunisia. The few thousand refugees that have been coming the last months should also be seen in the right perspective – last year France alone received 48.000 asylum seekers and Sweden 32.000 – the total number of refugees coming to the EU last year was 236.000.

As I wrote in my previous blog entry, migration policy needs long term strategies and well thought through measures and mustn’t be driven by populist movements. Next week I’ll present a Strategy Paper presenting a holistic approach on migration to my colleagues in the Commission. The Strategy Paper addresses the urgent need for a common European asylum and migration policy and the need for solidarity with the European countries most exposed to migration flows (Italy and Malta at this point), but also with neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, where the lion part of the refugees from Libya have fled to.”

On a slightly related point, the link between anti-immigrant views and increasing support for some political parties such the Front National and Marine Le Pen in France and the Northern League in Italy are well know.  In Finland a populist party, the True Finns, has for the first time entered Government after its stunning third place finish in the 17 April parliamentary elections.  Many have described the True Finns as populist party that is most interested in the Euro crisis and the financial bailouts.  But recent public comments of new True Finn MP Teuvo Hakkarainen reveal the anti-immigrant and racist sentiments held by some party members.  According to YLE, Hakkarainen said that “Negros” would be arriving at Finland’s borders and warned that minarets would arise all over Helsinki.  Some credit is due to True Finns Party chair Timo Soini who has reprimanded Hakkarainen for his comments.  The new Government has just been formed and the True Finns will chair the parliamentary committees responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence, and the Administration Committee which has responsibility for immigration issues.  Over 1000 people demonstrated in front of the Parliament building earlier in the week in support of tolerance and multiculturalism.

Click here (EN) and here (SV) for blog post.

Click here and here for YLE articles.

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Van Rompuy: Migration Danger Should Not Be Exaggerated; European Treaties Need to Be Respected

EU President Herman Van Rompuy said during an interview on Sunday that the danger of migration to Europe should not be exaggerated and that European migration treaties, including the Schengen agreement, need to be respected.  He said “[t]here is of course a migration danger, but do not overdo it.” (“Interrogé sur l’existence d’un danger migratoire lié à l’afflux de migrants depuis le début des révoltes dans le monde arabe, M. Van Rompuy a répondu : ‘Il y a bien sûr un danger migratoire mais il ne faut pas l’exagérer’, lors d’une émission d’une émission commune de la chaîne TV5Monde, la radio RFI et du journal Le Monde.”)  In regard to the Schengen agreement, he said “[n]either Italy nor France, until now, has done anything illegal. That said, there is a danger of not respecting the spirit of the Schengen Treaty…” (“Ni l’Italie, ni la France, jusqu’à présent, n’ont fait quelque chose d’illégal. Ceci dit, il y a un danger de ne pas respecter l’esprit du traité de Schengen…”)

Van Rompuy’s remarks are consistent with Jose Manuel Barroso’s statements last week reported by the EU Observer regarding the danger of the “immigration debate being hijacked by ‘populist and extremist’ forces in Europe.”  Barroso was quoted as saying “I don’t think it is in the interest of third countries [such as Tunisia] that there is a debate in Europe on such sensitive issues and that certain populist, extremist forces seek to take advantage of these problems.”

We got a small taste of the populist forces at work with yesterday’s results in Finland’s parliamentary elections and the strong third place showing of the True Finns led by Timo Soini.  While the True Finns are currently focused more on blocking the Portuguese financial bailout,  anti-immigrant sentiments within the party are strong.

Click here (FR), here (EN), and here (EN) for articles.

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French PM Fillon: Frontex Should Intercept and Return Migrants Directly to Tunisia

French Prime Minister Francois Fillon, after meeting yesterday with  EC President Jose Manuel Barroso, said that it does not make sense to intercept Tunisian migrants at sea and then bring them to Lampedusa; it would make better sense if the Frontex mission based in Italy intercepted Tunisian migrant boats at sea and returned them directly to Tunisia.

Fillon said: “There is no rule that provides for the reception and free movement on European territory of illegal economic migrants. A large portion of the Tunisian migrants who have arrived in Italy, are not destined, as some suggest, to be resettled in different European countries, they are destined to return to their country.” («Il n’y a aucune règle qui prévoit l’accueil sur le territoire européen et la libre circulation des immigrants économiques clandestins. Une grande partie des ressortissants tunisiens qui sont arrivés en Italie, n’ont pas vocation, comme certains le proposent, à être répartis dans les différents pays européens, ils ont vocation à retourner dans leur pays.»)  Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini praised Fillon’s proposal.

Click here (FR), here (IT), and here (IT) for articles.

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