Six persons have been rescued after a boat believed to be carrying 150 asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia sank in the Sunda Strait between Java and Christmas Island. The six survivors had been in the water for about 24 hours at the time of rescue by a merchant ship. Given warmer water temperatures in may be possible to survive for 36-48 hours in the water. Indonesian and Australian forces and private ships are searching for survivors. The boat’s passengers included women and children are believed to have been Afghan asylum seekers.
Category Archives: Indian Ocean
Five persons, including three children, are confirmed dead, and at least 15 are missing and presumed dead after a small boat (known locally as a “kwassa-kwassa”) sank off of the French island of Mayotte on 19 May. 19 people were rescued. The boat sank after striking a coral reef. The boat was attempting a 100 km voyage from the island of Anjouan in the Union of the Comoros to the French island of Mayotte. Approximately 200 people each year are believed to die attempting to make the 100 km voyage from the Comoros to Mayotte.
Mayotte, which is located off the coast of Mozambique and is geographically part of the Comoros Islands, became an Overseas Department of France in March 2011. The French government estimates that 40% of Mayotte’s population is without legal immigration status. According to a Reuters article, in 2011, “there were some 1200 applications for asylum in Mayotte, 41 per cent more than in 2010. The largest proportion of applicants came from the Union of the Comoros (90 per cent), with citizens from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Rwanda and Burundi, accounting for the rest. Last year some 20,000 people, including failed asylum seekers, were sent back from Mayotte to the Union of the Comoros and Madagascar.”
Click here for statement from La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme: “A Mayotte, ce n’est pas la mer qui tue, c’est la politique” (FR)
Foster and Pobjoy, Int J Refugee Law, “A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia’s ‘Excised’ Territory”
The latest edition of the International Journal of Refugee Law contains an article by Michelle Foster (Associate Professor and Director, Research Programme in International Refugee Law, Institute for International Law and the Humanities, Melbourne Law School) and Jason Pobjoy (PhD candidate in Law, Gonville and Caius College, University of Cambridge; Hauser Visiting Doctoral Researcher, New York University School of Law) entitled “A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia’s ‘Excised’ Territory.”
Abstract: “One of the hallmarks of contemporary state practice in the field of refugee law is the attempt by many states to exclude potential refugees from the international rule of law by implementing creative policies and practices designed to create ‘zones of exception’. This article analyses one of the most blatant attempts at creating a zone of exception in recent times, namely, the creation of more than 4,891 excised places in Australia in which the ordinary safeguards enshrined in the onshore domestic system of refugee protection were intended to be excluded. The article traces the history of the purported excision, outlines the key features of the so-called ‘non-statutory’ process that has subsequently been instituted on Christmas Island as an alternative to the onshore domestic system of refugee status determination, assesses its compatibility with international law, and describes and analyses a recent landmark decision of the High Court of Australia that unanimously and categorically rejected the notion that such a scheme could validly operate outside the (domestic) rule of law. It concludes by considering the domestic and international law ramifications of this decision for Australia’s current proposals for a new regional solution to its perceived refugee problem and, in particular, its recent ‘refugee swap’ arrangement with Malaysia.”
Click here for link. (subscription or payment required.)
If you have 2 ½ minutes to spare, this is a humorous comment on the current very bad situation in Australia. Click here for video.
(I saw this on the Migration Law listserv.)
Today, 26 August, marks the ten year anniversary of the beginning of the Tampa affair in Australia. On 26 August 2001, the Norwegian cargo ship Tampa responded to a distress call issued by the Australian Rescue Coordination Centre and rescued over 430 Afghan asylum seekers from a sinking migrant boat. Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s government refused to permit the Tampa to offload the rescued asylum seekers on Christmas Island, the closest place of safety. After a several day stand-off, the Tampa’s captain declared an emergency and entered Australian territorial waters. Australian SAS special forces boarded the Tampa and took control of the ship. The asylum seekers were eventually transferred to a naval vessel and sent to Nauru where they were detained. The incident marked the beginning of Australia’s so-called Pacific Solution policy.
Here is an excerpt from UNHCR’s 2006 State of the World’s Refugees report describing the incident:
“A recent renowned rescue at sea was carried out by the Norwegian merchant ship Tampa in August 2001. Sailing from Perth, Australia under the command of Captain Arne Rinnan, the freighter of the Wallenius Wilhelmsen Line received a call for assistance from the Rescue Coordination Centre of the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. The Tampa changed course and was guided by an Australian coastal search airplane to reach an Indonesian boat crowded with passengers and in acute distress. The boat was breaking up in heavy seas as the Tampa arrived just in time to transfer the 433 people on board to its own decks. The Norwegian ship had facilities on board for only 50 people, including its crew of 27.
The closest port to the site of the rescue was on Christmas Island, an Australian territory, but Australia’s Immigration Department forbade the Tampa to enter Australian territorial waters. The Australian government was determined to stop unauthorized arrivals of asylum seekers, and so refused to disembark the Tampa‘s passengers and permit the vessel to proceed on its scheduled route. After long and tense negotiations – during which conditions on board the Tampa reached crisis proportions – a complicated and costly arrangement saw the passengers forcibly removed from the ship and dispersed to camps in Nauru, a small state nearby. Some 132 unaccompanied minors and families were accepted by New Zealand, where almost all received refugee status. None went directly to Australia. In this long process, the owners and agents of the Tampa incurred substantial losses.
At the time, the obligation to render assistance to vessels in distress was codified in international maritime law in such instruments as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (1979). The obligation to extend aid applies without regard to the nationality, status, or circumstances of the persons in distress. Under these rules, ship owners, ships masters, coastal nations and flag states (the states where ships are registered) all have responsibilities for search and rescue.
The International Convention on Search and Rescue mandates that a rescue is not complete until the rescued person is delivered to a place of safety. That could be the nearest suitable port, the next regular port of call, the ship’s home port, a port in the rescued person’s own country, or one of many other possibilities. The convention provides that ‘a situation of distress shall be notified not only to consular and diplomatic authorities but also to a competent international organ if the situation of distress pertains to refugees or displaced persons.’ The ship itself cannot be considered a ‘place of safety’ – indeed, carrying a large number of unscheduled passengers could endanger the crew and passengers themselves, owing to overcrowding, insufficient food and water and the tensions of life at close quarters.
The inability to disembark rescued passengers in a timely fashion and return to scheduled ports of call lead to strong reluctance in the maritime industry to engage actively in search and rescue missions. For their principled actions in the face of such profound disincentives, in 2002 UNHCR gave the captain, crew and owner of the Tampa its highest award, the Nansen Refugee Award.
The Tampa affair helped focus international attention on the question of who has responsibility for accepting asylum seekers rescued at sea, adjudicating their claims, and providing a place of safety for those who are confirmed in their need for international protection. In 2002, the general assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a resolution seeking to identify any gaps, inconsistencies and inadequacies associated with the treatment of persons rescued at sea. IMO solicited the input of a number of UN agencies in a search for a coordinated approach to the issue.
Consequently, in 2004 IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted pertinent amendments to the International Convention for Safety at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. (These amendments are to enter into force on 1 July 2006.) At the same session, the committee adopted the current Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. The purpose of these amendments and the current guidelines is to ensure that persons in distress are assisted, while minimizing the inconvenience to assisting ships, and to safeguard the continued integrity of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.
The amendments impose upon governments an obligation to cooperate to ensure that captains of ships that have rescued persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with the minimum further deviation from the ship’s intended route. The government or party responsible for maritime safety and rescue where survivors are recovered is responsible for ensuring that a place of safety is provided. The guidelines, on the other hand, aim to help governments and masters of ships fulfil their legal and humanitarian obligations to persons rescued at sea.”
Click here for Wikipedia entry on the Tampa Affair.
Click here for UNHCR 2006 State of the World’s Refugees report.
According to an article in The Australian, “the Immigration Department approved 94 per cent of all refugee status claims from people arriving illegally by boat, after initial assessments and independent merits reviews, between October 2008 and December 22 last year. In stark contrast, the department approved only 39 per cent of protection visa requests for non-boat arrivals in the first half of this financial year…” “South Australian independent MP Bob Such, who lodged the [Freedom of Information] request [which resulted in the release of the data], said the high number of successful refugee claims by people arriving by boat showed the federal government’s detention policies were ‘flawed’. ‘Not only is the current policy costly and harmful to their mental state, it’s costly to Australia,’ Dr Such said. ‘They’re spending hundreds of millions . . . on detaining people who are no threat at all.’…”
Click here for full article.
(As reported in the Human Rights Law Resource Centre (Australia) Human Rights News Stories for the week ending 25 February 2011.)
The High Court of Australia issued a decision on 11 November concluding that asylum seekers initially detained on Christmas Island, a so-called “excised offshore place”, are entitled to access to courts and to the same legal protections and procedural fairness as asylum seekers on the mainland.
The unanimous seven judge decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth of Australia  HCA 41 (11 Nov 2010) determined that the process pursuant to which two Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers were found not to be persons to whom protection obligations were owed was unlawful because it was a “non-legal” or “non-statutory” process which “did not treat the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the decisions of Australian courts as binding, and further, failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness.” The two stage “non-legal” asylum process at issue has been in effect since 2008.
While the decision does not directly affect the Pacific Strategy, offshore detention practises, or the existence of the excised offshore places, the benefit of the strategy sought by past Governments and by the current Coalition Government to minimise the legal process afforded to asylum seekers within the excised offshore places by denying access to courts and judicial review has now apparently been eliminated by the High Court decision.
Click here for High Court decision.
Here is a lengthy excerpt from the decision which provides some of the historical background beginning with the 2001 incident involving the MV Tampa:
29. In 2001, the Parliament enacted six Acts, one after the other, which affected the entry into, and remaining in, Australia by aliens. Those six Acts were all assented to, and for the most part came into operation, on the same day. The first of those Acts, the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Border Protection Act“), sought to validate certain actions taken between 27 August 2001 and the commencement of the Act. The actions in question were actions taken by the Commonwealth, by any Commonwealth officer, or by any other person acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, in relation to the MV Tampa and certain other vessels, and actions in relation to persons who were on board those vessels during the relevant period. The circumstances that gave rise to those actions are sufficiently described in Ruddock v Vadarlis. In addition, the Border Protection Act, and several of the other five Acts, amended the Migration Act to change the way in which persons who arrived in, or sought to enter, Australian territory without a valid visa were to be dealt with.
30. Those changes had a number of features of immediate relevance to the present matters. First, certain Australian territory, including the Territory of Christmas Island, was excised from the migration zone, thus introducing the category of places called excised offshore places. A person who entered Australia at an excised offshore place, after the excision time, and who became an unlawful non-citizen because of that entry, was identified as an “offshore entry person”. The Migration Act was amended, by inserting s 46A, to provide that an application for a visa is not a valid application if it is made by an offshore entry person who is in Australia and is an unlawful non-citizen.
31. One of the consequential provisions made for dealing with unauthorised arrivals in places excised from the migration zone was to provide, by the insertion of s 198A into the Migration Act, that offshore entry persons might be taken from Australia to a country declared under that section. The new s 198A(3) provided that the Minister might declare a country for the purposes of that section by declaring that, in effect, the country in question provides access for persons seeking asylum to effective procedures for assessing their need for protection; provides protection for persons seeking asylum pending determination of their refugee status; provides protection to persons who are given refugee status pending their voluntary repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in another country; and meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection. An offshore entry person being dealt with under that provision is taken not to be in immigration detention. The Republic of Nauru and Papua New Guinea were declared countries and persons were removed from Australia to those places in exercise of the power given by s 198A.
32. The Department referred to the procedure contemplated by s 198A, of removing offshore entry persons from Australia to another country, as the “Pacific Strategy”. Removal of offshore entry persons to those countries began in 2001 but ceased in 2008.
33. While the so-called Pacific Strategy was operating, claims by offshore entry persons taken to a declared country that they were owed protection obligations were assessed according to procedures specified by the Department. The document that recorded those procedures began by stating Australia’s international obligations in the following terms:
“Australia’s primary obligation under the Refugees Convention is not to refoule (return) a refugee, either directly or indirectly, to a country where they have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground. Australia’s protection obligations extend to refugees who have entered Australia’s territorial seas. The Pacific strategy in no way detracts from these obligations.” (emphasis added)
Because persons dealt with under these procedures were not in Australia, but were in either Nauru or Papua New Guinea, s 46A of the Migration Act did not apply to prevent their making a valid application for a visa. But being outside Australia, and in a declared country, such persons could apply for only certain classes of visa and, in particular, could not apply for a Protection (Class XA) visa.
34. It is not necessary to examine further the operation of the arrangements that were made to effect the Pacific Strategy. What is presently important is that the changes to the Migration Act that were worked by inserting s 46A and, in consequence, inserting s 198A, are to be seen as reflecting a legislative intention to adhere to that understanding of Australia’s obligations under the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol that informed other provisions made by the Act. As the document recording procedures for administration of the so-called Pacific Strategy said:
“The new legislation underpinning the Pacific strategy has two mechanisms that reflect Australia’s obligations under Article 33 of the Refugees Convention and other Conventions. These mechanisms are:
. a framework to enable the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs to decide whether to allow an application for a visa to be made by unauthorised arrivals on excised offshore places (offshore entry persons) (while in Australia), following consideration of protection obligations under the relevant United Nations Conventions; and
. the ability to take unauthorised arrivals who have entered Australia at excised offshore places (such as Ashmore Reef and Christmas Island) to another country provided that the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has declared under s 198A of the Migration Act 1958 that the country [meets the requirements described earlier].” (emphasis added)
The Minister’s announcement
37. On 29 July 2008, the Minister announced that the Government had decided to strengthen and enhance the RSA [Refugee Status Assessment] process. This announcement followed an earlier announcement by the Government “that asylum claims of future unauthorised boat arrivals would be processed on Christmas Island”.
40. The adoption of these procedures, and their application in these particular cases, can only be understood as implementing the announcements that have been mentioned: one that the Pacific Strategy would no longer be followed; the other that steps of the kind ultimately recorded in the RSA Manual and the IMR Manual [“Guidelines for the Independent Merits Review of Refugee Status Assessments”] would be undertaken as the means of meeting Australia’s obligations under the Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol, instead of following the Pacific Strategy. And if the power to remove offshore entry persons from Australia under s 198A was not to be used, the only statutory powers that could be engaged to avoid breaching Australia’s international obligations were the powers under ss 46A and 195A.
The RSA Manual
41. The purpose of the RSA process was described in the RSA Manual as being “so that the Minister … can be advised whether Australia’s protection obligations under the Refugees Convention are engaged”. It was said that “[c]onsideration of the exercise of the Minister’s power under s 46A to allow a visa application to be made will occur following assessment of protection obligations as outlined in this manual”.
42. Much emphasis was given in the Manual to the RSA process being “a non-statutory process”. But the source of the power to undertake the process was not identified. Rather, the Manual described what were said to be some consequences of the process being “a non-statutory process”. In particular, it was said that “[t]his means that the Migration Act, the Migration Regulations 1994 … and Australian case law on the interpretations of the definition of a refugee and ‘protection obligations’ do not apply”, though it was said that “officers should be guided by these as a matter of policy”.
43. The Manual said that the common law rules of natural justice or procedural fairness were to be applied “to safeguard the fairness of the RSA procedures”. The particular procedures laid down in the Manual were described as being “modelled closely on the onshore [p]rotection visa determination procedures”. In that respect, it may be noted that, although the process was repeatedly described as “non-statutory”, the Manual proceeded on a footing that suggested that some provisions of the Migration Act applied to at least some aspects of the process. So, for example, the directions given in the Manual about seeking further information or comment from a claimant proceeded on the footing that what the Migration Act describes as “non-disclosable information” need not be disclosed, regardless of whether procedural fairness would require that to be done.
44. If, at the end of the RSA process, an offshore entry person was found to be owed protection obligations, the Manual described the consequence as being that a submission would be prepared by the Department for the Minister “advising the Minister that Australia’s protection obligations are engaged and seeking his/her agreement to lift the bar under s 46A of the Act”. By contrast, if the officer making the assessment determined that the person was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations, no submission would go to the Minister. Instead, an opportunity would be given to seek the review of the decision under the IMR process. If the outcome of the review was negative, an opportunity would be given to the person to provide any new or additional information which he or she wished the Department to take into consideration. A further assessment would be undertaken by the Department of whether any other international treaty obligation was engaged in the particular case. If no other international obligation was engaged, the process for removal of the person from Australia would begin.
The IMR Manual
45. As would be expected, much that was set out in the IMR Manual followed or reflected what was said in the RSA Manual. It is therefore not necessary to do more than mention some particular matters arising from the IMR Manual.
46. The system of Independent Merits Review was described, in the IMR Manual, as having been introduced as one of the new arrangements announced by the Minister on 29 July 2008. Previously, reviews of departmental assessments of refugee status had been undertaken by a senior officer of the Department.
47. Much emphasis was given in the IMR Manual (as it was in the RSA Manual) to the RSA process and the IMR process being “non-statutory”. Again, however, the Manual did not seek to identify what power was being exercised. Rather, the consequences said to follow from the process being “non-statutory” were identified. In particular, it was said in the IMR Manual that independent reviewers “may still be guided by the legislated interpretations of the Refugees Convention in sections 36 and 91R-91U of the Act and Australian case law on the interpretation of ‘protection obligations'”, but it was also said to be “important to note that these sources of interpretation are not binding authorities”.
48. The IMR process was subject to what the Department described as “a quality assurance check before an offshore entry person would be notified of the outcome of the IMR review”. That process, now supervised by the Registrar of the Refugee Review Tribunal (while on secondment to the Department), was said to “primarily [involve] checking IMR recommendations for spelling, grammatical, cut and paste or other obvious errors”. But it was a process that may “result in a suggestion being made to an independent reviewer that he or she may wish to consider an additional matter, consider more up to date country information, or clarify parts of a decision-record or recommendation”.
49. At the end of the review, the reviewer was to make a recommendation about whether Australia had protection obligations to the claimant. If the reviewer concluded that Australia did have protection obligations to the claimant, a departmental officer would prepare a submission to the Minister for consideration of the exercise of power under either s 46A(2) or s 195A. If the reviewer concluded that Australia did not have protection obligations to the claimant, no submission would be made to the Minister. Steps of the kind described in connection with the RSA process for considering engagement of any other relevant international obligation would be undertaken and, subject to that, processes for removing the claimant would then begin.
Click here for High Court decision.
200 Sri Lankans, mostly Tamil refugees, have agreed to leave the boat on which they have been living since October 2009. The boat has been under guard in the Indonesian port of Merak since it was intercepted by Indonesian authorities at the request of Australia. The boat and its passengers were trying to reach Australia. The migrants have been moved to the Indonesian immigration centre at Tanjung Pinang where their claims for asylum will be assessed by UNHCR. Australia has reportedly been paying the Indonesian government to intercept migrants seeking to sail to Australia. Some of the migrants on the boat recently managed to escape and reportedly used smugglers to reach Australia’s Christmas Island where they are now seeking asylum.
Click here for earlier post.
An Informal Meeting of EU Defence Ministers was held in Mallorca last week to discuss the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) established by the Treaty of Lisbon.
A decision was taken at the meeting to expand the objectives of Operation Atalanta to include the surveillance and control of Somali ports where pirate ships are based. This decision will be implemented later in the month of March as weather conditions in the region improve. The decision represents a potentially significant expansion of the EU’s anti-piracy operations.
Also attending the Informal Meeting were the ministers of defence from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. A side meeting was conducted with regard to improving co-operation in matters of security in the Euro-Mediterranean zone. The side talks pertained to the so-called “5+5 Western Mediterranean Defence Initiative” or more simply the “5 + 5 Initiative”.
Spanish Minister of Defence, Carme Chacón, who chaired the Informal Meeting said in regard to the meetings with the defence ministers from the five Maghreb countries:
“Spain is very clear on the fact that the Mediterranean is a sea of opportunities, but if we let our guard down then it can become a sea of problems – and we share this vision with all the associations we are involved in. At the moment it is a sea of peace and tranquillity, but both North and South must work together to tackle the dangers and new threats of the 21st Century, such as international terrorism, drug smuggling and organised crime. We must put our surveillance and maritime safety capacities into action in order to combat these threats, which could become an area of concern or a problem if we do not deal with them properly. And Spain will not forget this. In terms of the initiative of bringing together the countries of Europe and the Maghreb, we would like it to be not just the Spanish Presidency that sees to hold these meetings, but for the EU to be able to sit down regularly with these countries to discuss issues relating to the Mediterranean Sea, which must carry on being a source of opportunities rather than one of concern.”
Cliquez ici pour un article (blog post) en francais.
Approximately 250 asylum seeking Tamils have been held on board a boat in the Javanese port of Merak since October 2009 when the vessel was intercepted by Indonesian authorities. The vessel was attempting to reach Australia. The Tamils are refusing to leave the boat unless Australia agrees to accept them for resettlement.