Category Archives: Analysis

by | 05 Oct 2011 · 06:13

PACE Report: Lampedusa Reception Centres Not Suitable Holding Facilities for Migrants

The PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores has issued a report on the migrant reception centres on Lampedusa.  A delegation of the sub-committee members visited Lampedusa in May of this year.

From the PACE Press Release:  “The reception centres in Lampedusa are not suitable holding facilities for irregular migrants, in particular Tunisians. In practice, they are imprisoned there without access to a judge, according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores, in its report on its visit to Lampedusa*, which was declassified today [3 October 2011]. ‘The reception centres should remain just that and not be turned into holding centres,’ said Christopher Chope (United Kingdom, EDG), Chair of the ad hoc sub-committee and of the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population.  In this context, the ad hoc sub-committee is concerned by the tensions on the island, which have increased exponentially: arson in the main reception centre on 20 September caused serious damage and led to an upsurge in violence, leading the Italian authorities to declare Lampedusa an ‘unsafe port’. ‘These acts of violence are to be strongly condemned. They do not acknowledge the efforts of both the local population of Lampedusa and the Italian coastguards, who day after day do their utmost to rescue people at sea and to offer them temporary shelter on the island,’ declared the members of the ad hoc sub-committee….”

Excerpts from the Report:

“XV. Conclusions and recommendations

82. Much of the work observed by the delegation on Lampedusa warrants admiration, praise and broad support, even if some of the images provided in the media in the past have conveyed a rather more negative image. However some of the underlying problems noted by the delegation during its visit have manifested themselves in recent events, notably the arson attacks on the centre and the rising violence. Unfortunately what happened recently was foreseeable by the authorities and was inherent in the challenges of handling mixed flows of migrants and asylum seekers in the context of detention in a centre designed for reception.

83. What’s done is done, but lessons can usefully be learnt from the episode which has been painful both for Lampedusa and for the migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers who have been subjected to appalling conditions.

84. Lampedusa is still in the front line for arrivals of mixed migration flows by sea, in particular from Libya. The arrivals have not decreased in intensity and Italy and Europe must be ready to face up to a potentially even larger influx.

85. However, if we look at the number of arrivals so far, this is not a crisis for Italy or for Europe, but it is for Lampedusa.

86. In the immediate future, as soon as the situation is settled and the port is again considered safe, Lampedusa must remedy its limited reception capacity as the centres are immediately saturated by the arrival of boats with more and more people on board.

87. In the possibly very near future, if the number and frequency of arrivals increase, reception capacities in Italy will have to be brought into line. At the time of the visit, the Vice-Prefect and the Mayor were optimistic and convinced that the transfer system put in place was working, and that the situation would not deteriorate to the point reached earlier in the year. Furthermore, they considered that the transfer capacity could be increased through the planned provision of an additional boat. The members of the Sub-Committee at the time was confident that the Italian authorities would continue to do everything necessary to manage arrivals, even if their number were to increase. However, these measures – mostly designed for dealing with refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing Libya – have been proved insufficient to handle the challenge of handling the situation of the Tunisian migrants.

88. The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee wishes to voice its concern regarding a new agreement which the Italian authorities are reported to have signed with the authorities in Benghazi in Libya. The situation in Libya is not safe enough for people to be returned there and UNHCR’s position on this question remains unchanged. Furthermore, any attempt to deny access to persons entitled to international protection (and there are many of them in Libya) would be a clear breach of Italy’s international obligations.

89. There remains the issue of minimising loss of lives at sea and the need to ensure that all states fulfill their obligations of rescue at sea and the provision of access to international protection following any intervention.

90. Due to its proximity to North-Africa, Lampedusa is a key island to avoid even greater deaths at sea. If the boat people cannot hope to reach Lampedusa, their already highly dangerous journeys will become longer and therefore even more unsafe. To avoid more tragedies, Lampedusa’s reception capacities must be rebuild and improved as soon as possible.

91. The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee urges the Italian national, regional and local authorities to maintain their co-ordinated effort to manage arrivals of mixed migration flows in Lampedusa while complying with the relevant international standards and in co-operation with the international organisations and NGOs present on the island.

92. On the basis of its observations, the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee calls on the Italian authorities:

  • i. to continue to comply immediately and without exception with their obligation to rescue persons in distress at sea and to guarantee international protection, including the right of asylum and nonrefoulement;
  • ii. to introduce flexible measures for increasing reception capacities on Lampedusa;
  • iii. to improve conditions at the existing centres, and in particular the Loran base, while ensuring as a matter of priority that health and safety conditions meet existing standards – even when the centres are overcrowded – and carrying out strict and frequent checks to ensure that the private company responsible for running the centres is complying with its obligations;
  • iv. to ensure that new arrivals are able to contact their families as quickly as possible, even during their stay on Lampedusa, particularly at the Loran base, where there are problems in this regard;
  • v. to provide appropriate reception facilities for unaccompanied minors, ensuring that they are not detained and are kept separate from adults;
  • vi. to clarify the legal basis for the de facto detention in the reception centres in Lampedusa;
  • vii. where Tunisians in particular are concerned, only to keep irregular migrants in administrative detention under a procedure prescribed by law, authorised by a judicial authority and subject to periodic judicial review;
  • viii. to continue to guarantee the rapid transfer of new arrivals to reception centres elsewhere in Italy, even if their number were to increase;
  • ix. to consider the requests by the population of Lampedusa for support commensurate with the burden it has to bear, particularly in economic terms;
  • x. not to conclude bilateral agreements with the authorities of countries which are not safe and where the fundamental rights of the persons intercepted are not properly guaranteed, as in Libya.

93. Recalling the Assembly’s Resolution 1820 (2011) on “Asylum-seekers and refugees in Europe: sharing responsibilities”, the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee also recommends that all Council of Europe member states, and particularly the European Union member states, display greater solidarity by providing direct assistance to the countries, including Italy, which are currently faced with arrivals from the southern Mediterranean, and by accepting relocations within Europe where appropriate.

94. The Sub-Committee also urges member states to follow the example of the close co-operation between the Italian authorities and the member organisations of the “Praesidium Project” (UNHCR, IOM and the Red Cross) in managing arrivals and reception centres.

95. The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee invites the Italian authorities, through the Italian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly, to keep the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population, appraised of progress on the 10 specific issues raised above on a six monthly basis.”

Click here for Report.

Click here for PACE Press Release.

Click here for my previous post.

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by | 05 Oct 2011 · 05:20

Frontex Quarterly Reports for 2011 Q1 and Q2

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) released its 2nd Quarter Report (April-June) for 2011 on 4 October.  The 1st Quarter Report (Jan-March 2011) was released on 21 July.  As always, while the information is a few months old, the reports contain a significant amount of information, graphs, and statistical tables regarding detections of illegal border crossings, irregular migration routes, detections of facilitators, detections of illegal stays, refusals of entry, asylum claims, and more.

Here are extensive excerpts from the Q2 Report:

“Executive summary

In Q2 2011, all Frontex irregular-migration indicators increased compared to the previous quarter. The most important indicator, detections of illegal border-crossing, increased to a level not seen since Q3 2008 and correspondingly asylum applications are now at nearly the highest level since data collection began. What’s more, migration pressure at the border from migrants attempting to enter and stay in the EU increased even more than EU-level figures suggest, as they are offset against extensive reductions in Albanian circular migration.

In 2011 there were major and extensive developments in irregular-migration pressure at the external border of the EU, resulting from two simultaneous but independent hotspots of illegal border-crossings: the first was seasonally increased activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where a wide variety of migrants continued to be detected at very high levels. The second, and the undeniable hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the EU in Q2 2011, was in the Central Mediterranean, where vast numbers of sub-Saharan migrants landed in Italy and Malta mostly having been forcibly expelled from Libya. [***]

4. Main points Q2 2011

  • All irregular migration indicators increased relative to the previous quarter
  • Compared to a year ago, there were significant EU-level increases in several irregular migration indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries, and refusals of entry. There were also increased asylum applications
  • Despite detections of Afghan migrants falling by a third compared to last year, they were still the most common nationality detected illegally crossing the EU external border. Most were previously resident as refugees in Iran
  • In contrast, detections of all the other highly-ranked nationalities (Tunisians, Nigerians, Pakistanis, Ghanaians) increased massively relative to the same period last year
  • In total there were over 40 000 detections of illegal border-crossings, a 50% increase compared to Q2 2010. These were the result of two simultaneous but independent routes of irregular migration: the Eastern Mediterranean and the Central Mediterranean routes:

1. In the Eastern Mediterranean:

– There were over 11 000 detections of illegal border-crossing, almost exclusively at the Greek land border with Turkey, which is comparable with the same period in 2010

– This flow currently attracts migrants from north Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia

– Groups of Dominicans were detected travelling to Turkey to enter the EU via the Greek land border

– Secondary movements are assumed from detections of (i) illegal border-crossings in the Western Balkans, (ii) false documents on flights to major EU airports from Turkey as well as Greece, and (iii) landings in southern Italy from Greece, Turkey and Albania

2. In the Central Mediterranean:

– Following a bilateral return-agreement between Italy and Tunisia, the massive influx of Tunisians to Lampedusa reported in the previous quarter decreased, but remained significant

– A very wide range of sub-Saharan Africans were detected on this route, some having been forcibly departed from Libya

– Italy reported more detections of illegal border-crossing in Sicily than ever before, a three-fold increase compared to the previous quarter; the increased flow was composed of migrants from Côte d’Ivoire as well as Tunisia and a range of other nationalities

– There were also increased detections of Egyptian migrants and facilitators landing in Sicily and Southern Italy from Egypt

– Italy and Malta reported huge increases in the number of asylum applications submitted by sub-Saharan African migrants. In Italy increases were particularly marked for Nigerians and Ghanaians

  • Following their new visa-free status, fewer Albanians were detected illegally crossing the EU border, and illegally staying within the EU (both mainly in Greece). Instead they were increasingly refused entry to Greece and they were also increasingly detected at the UK border, either as clandestine entry or using false documents
  • There was an increased flow of Georgian migrants towards Belarus (air and land), with increased illegal entries and asylum applications in Poland and Lithuania
  • In Q2, Libya was the most significant source of irregular migration to the EU. However, more recently the ability of the Gaddafi regime to forcibly expel its migrant population to the EU has become compromised; the situation remains dynamic and uncertain[.]

4.1 Detections of illegal border-crossing

At the EU level, in Q2 2011 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing since Q3 2008. The total of 41 245 detections during this reporting period is a 25% increase compared the previous quarter and a 53% increase compared to the same period last year (Fig. 2). Without question there were major and extensive developments in illegal migration pressure at the external border of the EU, resulting from two simultaneous but independent hotspots of illegal border-crossings. The first was increased activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where a range of Asian, north African and sub-Saharan African migrants were increasingly detected at very high levels. The second, and the undisputed hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the EU in Q2 2011, was at the Italian islands in the Central Mediterranean, where vast numbers of Tunisians, Nigerians and other sub-Saharan migrants landed in small sea vessels, the majority of which in Q2 had been forcibly departed from Libya.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. In Q2 2011 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing since the peak of Q3 2008 nearly three years ago. Compared to a year ago, detections at the EU land border decreased by 42% to 13 742 in Q2 2011, almost exclusively due to fewer detections of Albanian nationals following their new visa-free status; elsewhere at the land border (including Greece) trends were roughly stable. In contrast, at the sea border detections increased nine-fold to some 27 500 detections (Fig. 2), the vast majority of which (95%) were in the central Mediterranean, forming the major development in irregular migration to the EU in 2011.

[***]

At the EU level, detections of illegal border-crossing increased by 53% compared to a year ago (Fig. 3). However, this level masks a lot of variation among Member States. First, and most importantly to the current situation, was a 4 200% increase in detections of almost exclusively African migrants in Italy. Related to this central Mediterranean flow, was a concurrent and massive increase in detections reported from Malta (from 0 to 710), and also increases further west into Spain (+61%). As a result, all these countries have seen increases in other indicators such as asylum applications of the most common nationalities (see relevant sections). [***]

Routes

As illustrated in Figure 4, for just the second time since records began in early 2008, in Q2 2011 detections of illegal border-crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, which comprises the blue borders of Italy and Malta, exceeded those reported from both the (i) Eastern Mediterranean route of the land and sea borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus, and (ii) circular migration from Albania to Greece.

Without question, in Q2 2011 the single most important irregular-immigration route in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing was the Central Mediterranean route, where detections increased in the beginning of 2011 to previously unprecedented levels (Fig. 4). In the first quarter of 2011, and uniquely compared to previous surges of illegal immigration, this flow was restricted to a single nationality – Tunisian, most of whom were responding to civil unrest in their home country by leaving towards the Italian Island of Lampedusa. In response to this almost unmanageable influx of irregular migration at a single and isolated location, a bilateral return agreement was signed between Italy and Tunisia, which allowed for the accelerated repatriation of newly arrived individuals. Hence, during the current reporting period, the flow of Tunisian migrants fell from over 20 200 in the previous quarter to 4 300 in Q2 2011.

However, civil uprising commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, and its effects on migration in the area, was not limited to Tunisia. For example according to multiple sources, in next-door Libya, migrants from sub-Saharan countries were in Q2 2011 being coerced to move towards the EU by the Gaddafi regime in response to the NATO Operation Unified Protector which commenced on March 27 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Thus, in Q2 2011, besides some continued departures from Tunisia, the flow in the central Mediterranean was composed of a single flow of large numbers migrants from sub-Saharan countries departing Libya in small vessels. [***]

4.1.1 Eastern Mediterranean route

Detections of illegal border-crossings on this route increased seasonally and in line with previous years, from 6 504 in Q1 2011 to 11 137 in Q2 2011, almost exclusively due to a massive increase in detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, where detections increased from 6 057 to 10 582. [***]

4.1.2 Central Mediterranean route

In Q2 2011 there were 26 167 detections of illegal border-crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, a 10% increase even compared to the ‘peak’ reported during the previous quarter, and evidently a massive increase compared to the negligible detections throughout all of 2010. The vast majority of detections on this route were reported from Italy (25 500) where detections increased by 13% even compared to the ‘influx’ of migrants reported during Q1 2011. In Italy, Central African, Tunisian, Nigerian and Ghanaian were the mostly commonly detected nationalities, 90% of which were detected in the Pelagic Islands (14 300), most notably Lampedusa (Fig. 7). However, in Q2 2011 there were also more detections of illegal border-crossing reported from Sicily (2 260) than ever before; this figure is nearly three times bigger than that reported in the previous quarter and more than twenty times higher than during the same period last year (100). Compared to the previous quarter, in Sicily there were more detections of migrants from a very wide range of countries such as Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire and Tunisia. There were also over 710 detections reported from Malta, which is a sustained peak from the previous quarter (820) and extremely high compared to the negligible detections throughout 2010. In Malta there were much fewer detections of Somalis and Eritreans but there were increased detections of Nigerians and migrants from Côte d’Ivoire. However, migrants from Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt often claim to originate from sub-Saharan Africa in an attempt to appear as refugees, a fact which may render such comparisons of nationalities somewhat misleading.

In the previous FRAN Quarterly (Q1 2011) it was reported a surge of irregular immigration (20 000 detections) on the Central Mediterranean route that was almost entirely restricted to a single nationality: Tunisian (Fig. 8). As a result of this influx, on 20 February the JO EPN-Hermes Extension 2011 commenced in the central Mediterranean, and a bilateral agreement was reached between Italy and Tunisia on 5 April 2011, which resulted in the strengthening of police surveillance along the Tunisian coast and regular repatriations of Tunisian nationals from Italy. For example, according to data collected under JO Hermes 2011, some 1 696 Tunisians were repatriated between 5 April and 23 August 2011. The repatriation agreement is probably an effective deterrent, combining as it does, returns and surveillance, however some migrants have reported their boats being spotted by military patrols that did not take any action. According to the FRAN data, in Q2 2011 some 4 286 Tunisian migrants were still detected illegally crossing the border into Italy. Although a massive reduction, this still represents a very large and significant flow of irregular migrants into the EU.

In comparison to the reduction in flow from Tunisia, in Q2 2011 there was a large increase in migrants who had departed from Libya (Fig. 9). The migrants departing from Libya were mostly nationals from countries in the Horn of Africa, the sub-Saharan and Central African regions and, to a lesser extent, Asia. According to intelligence collected during JO EPN-Hermes Extension 2011, most of these migrants had already been in Libya for over a year, originally heading to Tripoli via the traditional routes for sub-Saharan and Central African migrants. In Q2 2011, migrants tended to reach Italy on large fishing vessels that had departed directly from Tripoli or the nearby ports of Medina and Janzour. Most of these deported African nationals did not want to leave the country as their standard of living in Libya was high compared to their home countries. Several even stated that they would choose to return to Libya after the war. In Q2 2011 reports suggest that some migrants were instructed to reach embarkation areas on their own but had been caught by the military or police and then detained in camps or disused barracks until they were transported to embarkation areas and onto vessels bound for Italy. In each case the migrants were searched by the military before boarding and all their belongings were confiscated. According to reports, nationals of the sub-Saharan and Central African regions as well as from Horn of African countries have been recruited by the Libyan army/police to manage their compatriot migrants at gathering places or camps. In some cases the destination of vessels from Libya was Sicily, where the flow was characterised by waves of landings. For example there were around 11 landings on 13 May and 7 between 11 and 29 June, with the majority of boats arriving from Libya and Egypt. [***]

4.1.3 Western Mediterranean route

In Q1 2011 there were 1 569 detections of illegal border-crossings on this route to Southern Spain, which is nearly double compared to the previous quarter (890), and more than a 50% increase compared to a year ago (973). Some of this increase is due to better weather conditions at this time of year, but irregular migration pressure on this route is clearly higher than it was at the same time last year. [***]

In the longer-term, irregular immigration to southern Spain has been consistently decreasing since the beginning of 2006. Commonly cited reasons are Frontex Joint Operations in the area, effective bilateral agreements and more recently rising unemployment in Spain, particularly in sectors typified by migrants.* Nationalities traditionally associated with this route were Algerian, Moroccan and Ghanaian. [***]

4.1.4 Western African route

The cooperation and bilateral agreements between Spain and the rest of the Western African countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali) are developing steadily. They are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals on this route over the last year, as are the presence of patrolling assets near the African coast. In Q4 2010 Frontex reported a slight increase in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the Canary Islands, from a maximum of 50 during each of the previous 4 quarters, to 113 in Q4 2010. This increased level of detections persisted into the first quarter of this year (154), exclusively due to Moroccan nationals (152) displaced after the dismantling of migrant camps near the dispute Western Saharan region. However, during the current reporting period detections on this route decreased massively to a negligible 24 detections. [***]”

Click here for 2011 Q2 Report.

Click here for Frontex Statement regarding 2011 Q2 Report.

Click here for 2011 Q1 Report.

Click here for Frontex Statement regarding 2011 Q1 Report.

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by | 28 Sep 2011 · 04:55

Gaddafi and the Mercenary Myth

An interesting article on Huff Post by Prof. Carina Ray, Assistant Professor of African and Black Atlantic History, Fordham University:

“One of the biggest headlines to emerge in the early days of the battle for Libya was that Muammar Gaddafi had unleashed Black African mercenaries to put down the revolution. This turned out to be a largely bogus claim, but it nonetheless found traction among many ordinary Libyans. Why?  The mercenary myth was successful in galvanizing popular support for the rebels because it contained a tiny of kernel of truth. More importantly, it tapped into the smoldering resentment that many Libyans harbored against Gaddafi’s gradual shift away from the Arab world in favor of Africa….”

Click here for full article.

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by | 24 Sep 2011 · 04:27

Articles: European Journal of Int’l Law and Goettingen Journal of Int’l Law

“Fighting Maritime Piracy under the European Convention on Human Rights”, European Journal of International Law, Volume 22, Issue 3, by Stefano Piedimonte Bodini, Head of Division at the Programme and Budget Department of the Council of Europe (author’s opinions are strictly personal).  (subscription required)

Abstract: “On the basis of real examples of anti-piracy operations conducted in the Indian Ocean by European navies, the article examines the legal implications of such military actions and their judicial medium- and long-term consequences in the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights. The only existing authority directly addressing maritime piracy, although from the sole perspective of state jurisdiction, is the recent Grand Chamber judgment in Medvedyev and Others v. France. The Court’s approach and conclusions in Medvedyev will be analysed in section 2. Section 3 will explore other important issues likely to be raised under the Convention by anti-piracy operations. Section 4 will consider the question of state responsibility, i.e., jurisdiction and attribution, in the context of anti-piracy operations carried out on the high seas or on the territory of third states.”

“Refugees on the High Seas: International Refugee Law Solutions to a Law of the Sea Problem,” Goettingen Journal of International Law, by Killian S. O’Brien. (open access)

Abstract: “Following in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Europe’s southern marine borders have been the showplace of human tragedies previously unseen on this scale and the issue of refugees on the high seas has assumed a newfound importance. This article examines the flawed system provided by the ‘Constitution of the Oceans’, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for the protection of the lives of migrants at sea. It submits that international refugee law is well-equipped to assume a greater responsibility in ensuring the protection of those involved. Although the concept of non-refoulement cannot be stretched ad absurdum, it may still be reasonably interpreted as providing a temporary right to disembark for the purpose of processing possible asylum applications. In the long-term, a system of burden-sharing and permanent, yet flexible, reception agreements remain the only sustainable solution.”

“Rights at the Frontier: Border Control and Human Rights Protection of Irregular International Migrants,” Goettingen Journal of International Law, by Julian M. Lehmann. (open access)

Abstract: “In light of recent events causing people’s movement into Europe, continued misuse of the term “migrant” in policy making and public discourse, and at the occasion of events celebrating the international regime of refugee protection, the human rights protection of irregular migrants is explored in relation to irregular migrants’ entry/admission and expulsion/deportation. The term “migrant” has, in contrast to the term “refugee”, no bearing on whether or not an international migrant has a need for international protection. While many irregular migrants have no such need, other migrants may be refugees or be in need of international protection “outside” the framework of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The paper analyses the international human rights law framework applying to individuals with and without need for international protection, when their claims have a socio-economic dimension. The principle of non-refoulement remains the most important source of protection for irregular migrants; it is not concerned with the irregular status of a migrant and also has a bearing on procedural rights in status determination. Socio-economic motivations for flight are not a bar to being a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, if their underlying cause is persecution, or if motives are mixed. Refugee law can accommodate such claims and overcome a strict dichotomy but is currently only rarely and restrictively applied in this regard. In expulsion cases, virtually only the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is relevant. For individuals that have no need for international protection there are mitigating individual circumstances which a state has to take into account. All pertinent norms of international human rights law apply without distinction and irregular migrants may have, just as refugees may have, humanitarian needs that states should meet.”

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by | 23 Sep 2011 · 04:18

EP Study on Implementation of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Impact on Frontex, Europol, and EASO

The European Parliament Policy Dept. C has released a study requested by the LIBE Committee entitled: “Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support Office.”  The study is authored by Prof. Elspeth Guild, Dr. Sergio Carrera, Mr Leonhard den Hertog, and Ms Joanna Parkin.  The study will be presented in the 3 October 2011 LIBE meeting.

Abstract:  “This study sets out to examine the impact and implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights with respect to three EU Home Affairs agencies: Frontex, Europol and EASO. It assesses the relevance of the EU Charter when evaluating the mandates, legal competences and practices of these agencies, particularly in the fields of external border control and the management of migration.  After identifying specific fundamental rights guaranteed in the EU Charter that are potentially put at risk by the actions of these three agencies, and judicial obstacles that prevent individuals from obtaining effective legal remedies in cases of alleged fundamental rights violations, we present a set of policy recommendations for the European and national parliaments.”

Excerpts from the 100+ page study:

“KEY FINDINGS

  • EU home affairs agencies have confirmed themselves as distinct forms of EU regulatory agency. Their scope of action and tasks are not fully predetermined and defined in their founding regulations, at times allowing for the flexible accommodation, and sometimes extension, of their competences to new domains on an ad hoc basis. The three agencies have been granted important operational tasks that go beyond mere ‘regulatory activities’. Yet their dominant framing as depoliticised ‘coordinators’ or ‘facilitators’ of Member State actions has increased their relative autonomy, in some cases preventing a proper democratic scrutiny of the nature and impact of their activities and evading questions of accountability, responsibility and liability in cases of alleged unlawful actions, including potential fundamental rights breaches and risks. These observations are particularly pronounced in the cases of Frontex and Europol. It remains to be seen the extent to which the functioning and activities of EASO will follow a similar pattern.
  • Certain activities performed by Frontex, Europol and EASO as foreseen in their legal remits or developed through informal (de facto) practices present a sensitive relationship with specific fundamental rights provisions foreseen in the EU Charter. This is particularly relevant as regards three categories of actions common to each agency: 1) operational activities, 2) the exchange and processing of information and, in the case of Frontex and Europol, personal data (and the subsequent uses of this information) and 3) relations, cooperation (including so-called ‘capacity building’) and exchange of information with third countries through working arrangements and ‘soft law’. Inter-agency cooperation between Frontex, Europol and potentially in the future EASO, further magnifies the scope, and opens up new venues for, breaches of fundamental rights.
  • The relationship between Frontex, Europol (and to some extent) EASO and fundamental rights is further strained by their ‘home affairs focus’ and the legacy of cross-pillarisation which affects their policies, practices and political ambitions. A conflation of irregular migration with ‘insecurity’ and ‘threat’ legitimises the adoption of coercive policies which, together with a culture of secrecy and lack of transparency, exacerbates the vulnerable status of individuals targeted by the actions of these agencies.
  • There is a profound ‘knowledge gap’ concerning the added value, nature and impact of the activities by Frontex, Europol and EASO on the ground, as well as their full compatibility or coherency with EU internal and external policy priorities and legal frameworks. This report reveals a severe lack of information and monitoring of their actions, especially those of an ‘operational’ nature, which lead to legal uncertainties and accountability gaps that put the agencies at odds with the EU Charter and general rule-of-law principles of the European legal regime.
  • Finally, there is an anachronistic relationship between the overly-politicised nature of some of these EU home affairs agencies as a result of pressures applied by certain EU Member States and the European institutions to demonstrate the practical application of ‘the principle of solidarity’ and ‘mutual trust-based cooperation’ at EU level, and their weak democratic and public accountability. It is paradoxical that, despite the political drivers which steer the activities of EU Home Affairs agencies, their framing as ‘technical’ rather than political actors prevents a full and plural debate and accountability of their actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: A new ‘model of agency-building’ should be ensured and mainstreamed across current and future EU Home Affairs agencies. The model should act as a ‘standard setter’ against which the European Parliament and national parliaments can evaluate and scrutinise the performance and functioning of agencies, while still respecting agencies’ specific characteristics. Given the dynamic evolution of EU Home Affairs agencies, the model could be taken into account if and when the legal mandates of the agencies are opened for re-negotiation. The components and features of this model should include:

  • A more direct involvement of the European Parliament in the appointment of agency Executive Directors by requiring a binding approval from the Parliament for selected candidates.
  • A stronger representation of the European Commission on the Management Boards of agencies (a minimum of 5 Commission representatives, increased weighting of their votes and the granting of veto rights for certain fundamental rights sensitive issues.)
  • Advisory boards or ‘consultative forums’ should be established in all EU Home Affairs agencies as an integral part of their governance structure.
  • Time limits on the confidential status of documents pertaining to agency activities, which oblige the automatic release of such documents to the public within a set time frame should be put in place to promote transparency and public accountability.
  • Institutional structures for individuals to access effective legal remedies in cases of fundamental rights violations should be revised and developed.
  • Codes of conduct and comprehensive training in fundamental rights for all staff involved in agency activities, particularly operational actions, should be streamlined across all Home Affairs agencies.
  • Mechanisms to strengthen compliance with fundamental rights obligations on the ground should be included in the legal mandates of EU Home Affairs agencies: fundamental rights strategies and implementation plans, an in-house fundamental rights officer and independent monitor responsible for initiating disciplinary measures in case of misconduct.
  • To support internal accountability an independent Board of Appeals could be established composed of independent lawyers. Any challenged actions should be frozen while under consideration by the Board of Appeals.
  • EU Home Affairs agencies should have the competence to suspend or terminate activities if violations of fundamental rights occur in the course of those activities.
  • Clear legal definitions should be provided for key concepts related to agency tasks; agency actions should not exceed their legal remits and competences.
  • Comprehensive provisions on data protection should be integral to the legal mandates of EU Home Affairs agencies accompanied by independent supervisory bodies empowered to issue binding opinions.

Recommendation 2: The Inter-Institutional Working Group (IIWG) charged with identifying rules to support a global framework for regulatory agencies should explicitly recognise the fundamental rights-related accountability gaps identified by this report in the activities of EU Home Affairs agencies and take these into account it its final declaration.

Recommendation 3: A closer democratic scrutiny of agencies functioning, planning and work should be ensured through the creation of a permanent inter-parliamentary body or committee dealing specifically with regulatory agencies. The body should be run by the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee and include representatives from the corresponding committees of national parliaments.

Recommendation 4: In order to improve access to justice and effective remedies for individuals regardless of their nationality and/or location, subject to actions by EU Home Affairs agencies, a new branch of the Court of Justice should be established – an Agencies Tribunal – following the same format as the EU Civil Service Tribunal. This body would deal with admissibility claims and complaints of a legal and administrative nature against the agencies and national authorities participating in agencies’ operations and activities.

Recommendation 5: the Commission should have the competence to freeze Agency activities in cases of actual, suspected or imminent breaches of fundamental rights, while the legality of the case is being examined in detail. For such an ex ante procedure to be fully effective, careful attention should be paid to ensuring its overall objectivity, impartiality and democratic accountability. The procedure would be activated by the European Commission (on its own initiative or that of the European Parliament) on the basis of evidence provided by impartial actors such as the EU Agency on Fundamental Rights (FRA) or a new external network of independent and interdisciplinary experts/academics working in close cooperation with civil society organisations based in the different member states.

Recommendation 6: A new piece of secondary law should be adopted specifying the access to rights and to justice by third country nationals subject to new border and migration controls (including those taking place ‘extraterritorially’). The tasks and competences of the EU Home Affairs agencies call for more legal certainty. Their remits and activities and allocation of responsibilities should be clearly defined in law. Any experimental governance activities should be avoided in order to ensure respect for the principles of legal certainty and accountability.

Recommendation 7: Particular attention should be paid to the practical implementation of EASO’s mandate, given the particularly sensitive nature of some of the agency’s tasks from a fundamental rights viewpoint. Guaranteeing the right to asylum envisaged in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should constitute an explicit priority for EASO and the agency’s work should be focused first and foremost around this objective.

Recommendation 8: The fundamental rights sensitivities of Europol’s work and safeguards should be taken into account when Europol’s mandate is re-opened for negotiation in 2013. DG Justice should play an active role during the preparation of the Commission’s proposal for a Europol Regulation to conduct a fundamental rights proofreading of the new legislation. Moreover, the European Parliament should ensure that the new ‘model of agency-building’ proposed in Recommendation 1 of this report would be mainstreamed to Europol to the largest extent.

Recommendation 9: The European Parliament should call upon Frontex to no longer conduct any joint operation in the maritime territory of third states, as the consistency of this practice is not only questionable with respect to the rule of law principles of legal certainty and accountability, but it is also at odds with fundamental rights foreseen in the EU Charter.”

Click here for Study.

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by | 22 Sep 2011 · 03:07

Eurostat: Asylum Statistics for Q1 2011

Eurostat has issued a statistical report regarding the number and makeup of asylum applicants in the 27 EU member states and Norway, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein for the First Quarter 2011.  The report documents the increased number of applications filed in Italy by Tunisians, but note that the report only addresses data through 31 March 2011.

Highlights include:

  • Nearly 66 000 persons sought asylum in one of the EU Member States during the first quarter of 2011, an increase of 4 000 compared with the same period of the previous year.
  • France and Germany remained the top destination countries of asylum applicants with 14 300 and 12 000 applicants respectively.  France and Germany received 40% of the total applications filed.
  • Germany (+ 2 700) and Italy (+1 300) recorded the highest increases in numbers of applicants in absolute terms compared to the first quarter of 2010, while Sweden (- 1 900) and the Netherlands (-700) recorded the largest falls.
  • In the first quarter of 2011, the main citizenships of people seeking asylum in the EU-27 were Afghans (5 800), followed by Russians (4 100) and Iraqis (3 800).
  • Tunisians (2 500) are now ranked eighth among the main countries of citizenship of asylum seekers.  90% of the Tunisian applications were made in Italy.
  • 55 600 first instance decisions on asylum applications were issued in the EU-27 during the first quarter of 2011. One out of four of such decisions was positive; in total 13 500 persons received some type of protection status, including refugee status (6 800 decisions), subsidiary protection (4 600 decisions) or authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons (2 100 decisions).

Click here for Eurostat report.

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Asylum applicants, absolute and relative change between Q1/2010 and Q1/2011

Asylum applicants, EU-27, January 2010 – March 2011

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by | 25 Aug 2011 · 18:30

Malmström’s Response to Dagens Nyheter Editorial Regarding EU’s Past Negotiations with Libya

Commissioner Cecilia Malmström posted a response on her blog to yesterday’s editorial in Dagens Nyheter regarding the EU’s efforts to negotiate a migration agreement with the Gaddafi government last year.  Her response is in Swedish and I reproduce below a Google English translation (slightly tweaked by me using my non-existent Swedish skills).  Please rely on the original Swedish text for accuracy.

Google translation:

“Conflict between principles

As I write today in [Dagens Nyheter] in reply to yesterday’s main leader, the purpose of the trip to Libya in 2010 was, among other things to try to get permission for cooperation in regard to the some 1.5 million migrants who were there. UNHCR had at that time determined that about 9000 of these were refugees and in need of help.

The partnership also included earmarked funding for UNHCR and IOM’s activities in Libya. The agreement also included cooperation on border control and better conditions for migrants and asylum seekers. For the first time we had with wording in an agreement on human rights and the concept of asylum, which was in the Libyan law.

Together with UNHCR and IOM, we tried from the EU side to find a means to protect the most vulnerable. Because of reluctance by the Libyan government to agree to our demands we made limited progress and shortly afterwards the civil war broke out.

It can later be viewed credulously [incredulously?] to believe that it would succeed, but the political situation that appeared at the time was the reality that we had to relate to in order to help these people. We can not ignore the realities, but must do whatever we can to help people who suffer abuse and unfair treatment. It is painful that sometimes this means we have to make exceptions to the principle of not negotiating with totalitarian states, but when there are no alternatives, the principle of humanity must be greatest.”

Original text:

“Konflikt mellan principer

Som jag idag skriver i DN, i replik till gårdagens huvudledare, var syftet med resan till Libyen 2010 att bla försöka få tillstånd ett samarbete rörande de omkring 1,5 miljoner migranter som fanns där.  UNHCR hade då hittills bedömt att omkring 9000 av dessa var konventionsflyktingar och i behov av hjälp.

Samarbetet innebar bland annat öronmärkt finansiering av UNHCR och IOM:s verksamhet i Libyen. Avtalet innefattade också samarbete kring frågor om gränskontroll och bättre villkor för migranter och asylsökande. För första gången någonsin fick vi med i avtalet formuleringar om mänskliga rättigheter och begreppet asyl, något som inte fanns i den libyska lagstiftningen.

Tillsammans med UNHCR och IOM försökte vi från EU:s sida hitta en möjlighet att skydda de allra mest utsatta. På grund av ovilja från den libyska regimen att gå med på våra krav kom samarbetet ingenvart och kort därefter bröt inbördeskriget ut.

Det kan i efterhand ses som godtroget att tro att det skulle lyckas, men som det politiska läget såg ut då var det den verklighet vi var tvungna att förhålla oss till för att kunna hjälpa dessa människor. Vi kan inte blunda för hur verkligheten ser ut utan måste göra vad vi kan för att hjälpa människor som utsätts för övergrepp och orättvis behandling. Det är smärtsamt att det ibland innebär att vi måste göra undantag från principerna om att inte förhandla med totalitära stater men då alternativ saknas måste principen om medmänsklighet vara störst.”

Click here for Malmström’s response.  (SV)

Click here for Dagens Nyheter editorial.  (SV)

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by | 25 Aug 2011 · 04:36

Malmström’s “Unfortunate Voyage to Libya”

An editorial by Annika Ström Melin in Dagens Nyheter (Sweden) summarised by Presseurop:

“‘An unfortunate voyage to Libya’ headlines the Dagens Nyheter editorial, which looks back on European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström’s visit to Libya in October 2010. [***] In practice [the agreement signed by the Commissioner in Libya] amounted to employing Gaddafi as an EU border guard, notes the Stockholm daily [***].  ‘It is easy to be clever with the benefit of hindsight,’ remarks the daily, ‘but the agreement with Gaddafi was already scandalous when it was signed. Today Cecilia Malmström will have to provide full information about the consequences of this meeting. Was there a dialogue? Where did the money go?’ In conclusion, Dagens Nyheter affirms that the entire EU should ask itself the question of how it came to sign a treaty with Gaddafi.”

Click here for Presseurop article.

Click here for Dagens Nyheter editorial.  (SV)

Click here and here for my previous posts on the Commissioner’s trip to Libya.

[UPDATE 25 August – Click here for Malmström’s response to the editorial.]

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by | 27 Jul 2011 · 05:27

Issue Brief- Cutting Off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent Migration

An Issue Brief, “Cutting Off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent Migration,” written by Eleanor Taylor-Nicholson, has been published by the Warren Institute for Law and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley.  The issue brief was written as a background paper for a conference held by the Warren Institute at UC Berkeley Law School on 22 April 2011.

Excerpt: “… This issue brief explores the extent to which the United States, Europe and European governments have implemented different extraterritorial controls. Although we hear of such controls in the media, how common are they? Who is overseeing them? What do they involve? What are concerns with their use? To answer these questions, this brief presents information on key actors, including individual nation-states and their agents, and on the range of mechanisms used by both. A comparison of two major immigration destinations is included to consider similarities and differences in the use of extraterritorial controls by states.

A review of the literature and media reports finds that extraterritorial controls include a diverse range of measures by different actors, some of which have been extremely controversial, such as maritime interdiction and offshore detention, and others that are more accepted or less understood, such as visa controls and disruption of organized immigration crime. Further, while such controls are now ubiquitous in both regions, their design and implementation generally lack public oversight and accountability mechanisms. They may protect states from security threats, have the potential to provide early protection to people in need, and save traveling migrants in distress. But, if used primarily as an immigration deterrence mechanism, they can cause harm. Indeed they may provide states a means to evade their international obligations or lead to violations of international refugee law and human rights law.

In light of this, we recommend governments conduct a comprehensive and public review of the extraterritorial controls they have in place, taking into consideration international refugee and human rights commitments. We also urge governments to increase the transparency of their immigration control agreements with third parties, including private actors and other states….”

Click here for Issue Brief.

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by | 01 Jul 2011 · 05:04

Klepp, Int J Refugee Law, “A Double Bind: Malta and the Rescue of Unwanted Migrants at Sea, a Legal Anthropological Perspective on the Humanitarian Law of the Sea”

An article by Silja Klepp (Research Associate, Research Center for Sustainability Studies (artec), University of Bremen) entitled “A Double Bind: Malta and the Rescue of Unwanted Migrants at Sea, a Legal Anthropological Perspective on the Humanitarian Law of the Sea” has been published as an online advance access article by the International Journal of Refugee Law.

Abstract: “This paper discusses research results from anthropological fieldwork carried out in Malta in 2007. The island, which is situated in the central Mediterranean Sea between Tunisia, Libya and Italy, is a focal point regarding the continuing refugee situation. One of the research aims was to investigate the situation at sea concerning Search and Rescue (SAR) operations for migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean by boat. In the year 2006, 556 missing and drowned migrants were registered in the central Mediterranean between Libya, Malta and Italy, this number increased to 642 in 2008.1 The goal of the research in Malta was therefore to understand why an increasing number of migrants were dying at sea and what role the European security forces play in this context.

After introducing the research perspective of this article, background information concerning migration movements in the Mediterranean Sea between Libya, Italy and Malta in recent years is provided. Due to European regulations, which are considered unfavourable for the island, and its population density, Malta feels under pressure from migrants arriving by boat across the Mediterranean. Different concepts regarding a ‘place of safety’ to disembark rescued boat migrants are debated. The ambiguities in the responsibilities cause problems for the captains who rescue migrants in distress at sea. These ambiguities may in turn lead to a weakening of the SAR regime. Following discussion of the legal and political quarrels on the place of safety, the SAR operations at sea of the Armed Forces of Malta is analysed. The findings show that it is not merely a case of enforcing legal norms created by international law. The process is much more complex: legal gaps are filled by regional actors, through informal or even illegal practices, asserting their own claims at their convenience. Thus, transnationalization processes of law, such as the international SAR regime, are a fragmented and ambiguous set of regulations, creating space for negotiation and manoeuvre.2”

Click here for link.  (Subscription or payment required.)

Also by Klepp from 2010, European Journal of Migration and Law: “A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea.”

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by | 14 Jun 2011 · 04:12

Moreno-Lax, Int J Refugee Law, “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea”

The latest edition of the International Journal of Refugee Law, contains an article by Violeta Moreno-Lax (PhD Candidate at Université catholique de Louvain; Visiting Fellow 2010-11 at Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford) entitled “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea.”

Abstract: “Although both international and EU law impose a number of obligations on the EU Member States with regard to persons in distress at sea, their effective implementation is limited by the manner in which they are being interpreted. The fact that the persons concerned are migrants, who may seek asylum upon rescue, has given rise to frequent disputes and to episodes of non-compliance. Frontex missions and the Italian 2009 push-back campaign illustrate the issue. With the objective of clarifying the scope of common obligations and to establish minimum operational arrangements for joint maritime operations, the EU has adopted a set of common guidelines for the surveillance of the external maritime borders. On the basis of the principle of systemic interpretation, this article intends to contribute to the clarification of the main obligations in international and European law binding upon the EU Member States when they operate at sea.”

This is a revised and updated version of the paper presented at the 12th IASFM Conference held in Nicosia, 28 June-2 July 2009.  [The article was written and sent for typesetting before the various uprisings in North Africa – IJRL Editor, 4 March 2011]

Click here for link.  (Subscription or payment required.)

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by | 08 Jun 2011 · 03:29

CARIM: Libya Migration Profile

CARIM has published an updated Migration Profile for Libya.  The profile includes IOM data regarding migrant departures from Libya between 20 February and 26 May 2011 which again highlights the humanitarian burden imposed on Tunisia and Egypt relative to Italy and the EU.

Tunisia received 232,856 individuals from Libya during this period (185,442 of whom were TCNs) which is 43.8% of the total number of migrants who have fled Libya.  Egypt received 172,318 individuals (74,911 TCNs) which constitutes 32.4% of the migrants who have fled.  Italy received 13,110 individuals (all TCNs) which constitutes 2.5% of the total.   Niger received 13.1% of the total, Chad 5.1%, Algeria 2.3%, and Malta 0.3%.

Click here for the Profile.

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by | 31 May 2011 · 06:14

UNODC Report: The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the EU

UNODC released a report on 30 May: The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union.  From the UNODC web page: “… The new report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) investigates the involvement of organized criminal groups in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa towards the European Union (EU).  The involvement of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants is a sensitive and controversial issue in West African countries, as the report discusses at various points. The publication contributes to better understand the underlying mechanisms and actors involved in this criminal process as a basis for policy reforms in countries affected.

Information in the report was compiled by a team of researchers from West Africa and Europe using both documentary studies and field research conducted in Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Spain. …  UNODC, as guardian of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, possesses specific expertise and experience that could be put at the service of all countries affected to support them in matters linked to prevention, legislation, operations or prosecution.”

From the Report’s Summary:  “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through the European Union-funded ‘Law enforcement capacity-building to prevent and combat smuggling of migrants in the ECOWAS region and Mauritania (Impact)’, undertook to investigate the role played by organized criminal groups in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to Europe.

The present report is aimed primarily at decision makers, law enforcement and judicial officials, but also at a wider audience interested in irregular migration. It contributes to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms and actors involved in this criminal process as a basis for policy reforms in the West African countries concerned.  This report was prepared through desk and field research, conducted in Mali, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Spain. Interviews were conducted with over 200 people in Africa and Europe belonging to three main groups: migrants, national authorities and non-governmental organizations, and smugglers.

Four main findings can be mentioned:

• Transnational organized criminal groups are generally involved in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to Europe. However, there are important differences among them in terms of specialization and professionalism. With regard to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of non-African irregular migrants, criminal groups are clearly well organized and structured, and keep close contacts with operatives in several countries. On the other hand, other would-be migrants in West Africa have to deal with loose networks that are not permanently structured. Various groups of actors usually collaborate for one particular operation, and there are no exclusive relationships between those criminal groups.

• Specialization and the building of transnational criminal networks usually come as a result of increased efficiency in border interdiction. Within West Africa, freedom of movement gives little incentive, if any, to engage in the smuggling of migrants. However, the situation changes when there are natural obstacles, such as the sea, or man-made obstacles, such as surveillance

• In most cases, smugglers are migrants themselves. Realizing that their knowledge acquired through (often painful) experience may be used by other migrants in exchange for remuneration, some migrants decide to enter the business of smuggling of migrants. They may then become specialized professional smugglers, or they use their knowledge to finance the completion of their journey to Europe.

• Irregular migrants generally do not see themselves as victims, and smugglers do not see themselves as criminals. A complex relationship exists between irregular migrants and smugglers. The latter have an interest in maintaining the flow and feeding youngsters with dreams of success. These dreams are also kept alive in some West African countries by families and circles where important social value is attached to those who decide to leave, as well as by those who have made it to Europe, be it legally or illegally, even though their situation in Europe is often worse than it was at home….”

Click here for Report.

Click here for article on UNDOC web page.

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by | 25 May 2011 · 05:20

Migreurop Report: “Frontex: Which Guarantees for Human Rights”

Migreurop has released a 48 page report (EN and FR) entitled “Frontex Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights.”  The Report was prepared with a view to the revision of the Frontex mandate.  Here are the Report’s conclusion and recommendations:

“It is not enough to decree that fundamental rights must be respected: it is also necessary to provide the legal means and democratic safeguards needed to achieve this. The proposal for a Regulation amending the Regulation establishing the FRONTEX Agency does neither of these things. Over the five years in which the Agency has been operating, many questions have been asked about the compatibility of its functioning with respect for the rights of individuals. The Commission’s proposed Regulation only addresses a very few of these questions, and raises many more. Until the Agency’s objectives are fundamentally reviewed and seen in the context of the threats the Agency poses to respect for rights, it is questionable whether FRONTEX itself is compatible with human rights.  In the meantime, a number of measures should be introduced into the amended Regulation to bring the rules governing the functioning of FRONTEX more closely into line with standards on fundamental rights:

— There should be a clear division of responsibilities between Member States and FRONTEX in line with the Agency’s expanded role, ensuring that FRONTEX has full legal responsibility for acts committed during the operations that it coordinates, wherever they take place.

— It should be explicitly stated that all operations coordinated by FRONTEX must comply with EU directives on asylum, in particular Directive 2003/9 (on reception) and Directive 2005/85 (on procedures), as well as the principle of non-refoulement, including during interventions at sea wherever they take place, and during interventions involving officials acting under the authority of FRONTEX and liaison officers deployed by the Agency.

— It should be explicitly stated that operations coordinated by and/or involving officers placed under the authority of FRONTEX outside EU territory must be consistent with respect for the right to leave any country, including one’s own (Article 12.2 ICCPR).

— Independent monitoring mechanisms should be implemented during operations coordinated by FRONTEX (joint operations, joint return operations, deployment of liaison officers), and the conclusions and follow-up of monitoring operations should be communicated regularly to the European Parliament and made public.

— For monitoring of joint return operations, enough personnel should be made available to ensure that monitoring can take place at every stage, including inside the places of detention where deportees are held, onboard aircraft, and when deportees are handed over to the authorities of the country of return.

— The Code of Conduct for return operations should be made binding.

— Decisions taken by FRONTEX in relation to joint operations and pilot projects that it coordinates should be made available to the European Parliament.

— There should be mandatory consultation of the European Parliament whenever negotiations are opened between FRONTEX and a third country or the authorities of that country, and any agreement reached by FRONTEX during the negotiations should be submitted to the Parliament before being concluded.”

(While the Report was just added to the Migreurop web site, it may be that the French version of the report was released late last year.)

Click here (EN) or here (FR) for Report.

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by | 24 May 2011 · 05:31

EJML Article, Stefanie Grant: “Recording and Identifying European Frontier Deaths”

The latest edition of the European Journal of Migration and Law, Volume 13, Number 2, contains an article by Stefanie Grant, University of Sussex, entitled “Recording and Identifying European Frontier Deaths.”

Abstract: “Migrant deaths at EU maritime borders have more often been seen in the context of national border control, than in terms of migrant protection and human rights. The 2009 Stockholm Programme accepted the need for action to avoid tragedies at sea, and to `record’ and `identify’ migrants trying to reach the EU. But it did not specify how this should be done. There are parallels between these migrant deaths, and deaths which occur in conflict and humanitarian disaster. The principles of human rights and humanitarian law which apply in these situations should be developed to create legal and policy frameworks for use in the case of migrants who are missing or who die on EU sea frontiers. The purpose would be to enable evidence of identity to be preserved, to protect the rights of families to know the fate of their relatives, and to create common national and international procedures.”

“This article draws on publications by the author, including: ‘Migration and frontier deaths: a right to identity’, in Marie Bénédicte-Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.), Are Human Rights for Migrants?: Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011 [in press]; ‘The Legal Protection of Stranded Migrants’, in Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud and Euan Macdonald (eds.), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, pp. 29–48; and ‘International Migration and Human Rights’; expert paper for the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), 2005.”

Click here for link.  (Subscription or payment required.)

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