Tunisian authorities report that one or more migrant boats that had departed from Libya capsized and sank near the Tunisian coast on Tuesday near the Tunisian island of Kerkennah. There are currently conflicting media reports on the number of boats involved. The boat(s) are is thought to have been carrying approximately 800 people in total. Over 500 people have reportedly been saved. Approximately 270 are missing and assumed dead.
Click here, here, and here for articles.
Filed under Italy, Libya, Mediterranean, News, Tunisia
UNODC released a report on 30 May: The Role of Organized Crime in the Smuggling of Migrants from West Africa to the European Union. From the UNODC web page: “… The new report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) investigates the involvement of organized criminal groups in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa towards the European Union (EU). The involvement of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants is a sensitive and controversial issue in West African countries, as the report discusses at various points. The publication contributes to better understand the underlying mechanisms and actors involved in this criminal process as a basis for policy reforms in countries affected.
Information in the report was compiled by a team of researchers from West Africa and Europe using both documentary studies and field research conducted in Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Spain. … UNODC, as guardian of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, possesses specific expertise and experience that could be put at the service of all countries affected to support them in matters linked to prevention, legislation, operations or prosecution.”
From the Report’s Summary: “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through the European Union-funded ‘Law enforcement capacity-building to prevent and combat smuggling of migrants in the ECOWAS region and Mauritania (Impact)’, undertook to investigate the role played by organized criminal groups in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to Europe.
The present report is aimed primarily at decision makers, law enforcement and judicial officials, but also at a wider audience interested in irregular migration. It contributes to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms and actors involved in this criminal process as a basis for policy reforms in the West African countries concerned. This report was prepared through desk and field research, conducted in Mali, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Spain. Interviews were conducted with over 200 people in Africa and Europe belonging to three main groups: migrants, national authorities and non-governmental organizations, and smugglers.
Four main findings can be mentioned:
• Transnational organized criminal groups are generally involved in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to Europe. However, there are important differences among them in terms of specialization and professionalism. With regard to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of non-African irregular migrants, criminal groups are clearly well organized and structured, and keep close contacts with operatives in several countries. On the other hand, other would-be migrants in West Africa have to deal with loose networks that are not permanently structured. Various groups of actors usually collaborate for one particular operation, and there are no exclusive relationships between those criminal groups.
• Specialization and the building of transnational criminal networks usually come as a result of increased efficiency in border interdiction. Within West Africa, freedom of movement gives little incentive, if any, to engage in the smuggling of migrants. However, the situation changes when there are natural obstacles, such as the sea, or man-made obstacles, such as surveillance
• In most cases, smugglers are migrants themselves. Realizing that their knowledge acquired through (often painful) experience may be used by other migrants in exchange for remuneration, some migrants decide to enter the business of smuggling of migrants. They may then become specialized professional smugglers, or they use their knowledge to finance the completion of their journey to Europe.
• Irregular migrants generally do not see themselves as victims, and smugglers do not see themselves as criminals. A complex relationship exists between irregular migrants and smugglers. The latter have an interest in maintaining the flow and feeding youngsters with dreams of success. These dreams are also kept alive in some West African countries by families and circles where important social value is attached to those who decide to leave, as well as by those who have made it to Europe, be it legally or illegally, even though their situation in Europe is often worse than it was at home….”
Click here for Report.
Click here for article on UNDOC web page.
Filed under Analysis, Eastern Atlantic, European Union, Mauritania, Mediterranean, Morocco, Niger, Reports, Senegal, Spain, United Nations, UNODC
The Commission released its second Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum for 2010 on 24 May (COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL). Accompanying the 12 page Report is an 82 page Staff Working Paper. Excerpts from the Commission press release regarding the Report:
“On Asylum:
“On preventing irregular migration:
“On effective Border Control:
I have reproduced about half of the Annual Report here, but have not had time to begin reading the Staff Working Paper.
Excerpts from Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010):
“[***]
The present Annual Report is presented in response to the request made by the European Council when adopting the 2008 Pact on Immigration and Asylum[1] and covers the developments during 2010 in the implementation of the Pact and the relevant priorities of the Stockholm Programme adopted in 2009[2], both at the EU and the national level. The report has been prepared on the basis of Member States’ contributions and other information, in particular reports from the National Contact Points (NCPs) of the European Migration Network (EMN).
The report summarises and assesses developments at the EU and the national level[3], and puts forward recommendations for future action.
II. Entering and Residing in the EU
[***]
1. Legal migration – ensuring a legal way to enter the EU
[***]
2. Asylum – granting international protection and ensuring solidarity
| In 2009 Member States recorded 266 400 asylum applications, the number in 2010 was 257 815, a slight decrease of 3%. While Poland, Italy, Hungary and Malta received less asylum-seekers in 2010 than in 2009, significant increases were recorded in Germany, Belgium and Sweden.
In 2010, the most important countries of citizenship of asylum-seekers in the EU were, in order: Afghanistan (20 580), Russia (18 500), Serbia (17 715, excluding Kosovo*[4]), Iraq (15 800) and Somalia (14 350). In 2010, 55 095 asylum-seekers received a protection status in the EU at first instance (refugee, subsidiary protection or humanitarian). Protection was therefore granted in 25% of decisions taken in first-instance procedures. In 2009, 7 147 refugees were resettled in the EU from third countries. The figure for 2010 was [until Q3] 3 848. |
Legislative progress was slow and difficult in the field of asylum in 2010. The co-legislators agreed on the extension of the scope of the Long-Term Residents Directive to beneficiaries of international protection, and made some progress on the Dublin and Eurodac Regulations as well as on the Qualification Directive. To give an impulse to the stalled negotiations on the Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures Directives, the Commission will adopt modified proposals on these two instruments in June 2011.
The adoption in 2010 of the Regulation for the creation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was a significant development. The Commission is working actively so that the EASO becomes operational in June this year in view of boosting practical cooperation.
Solidarity among Member States is needed as one of the components of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). A pilot project for the relocation from Malta to ten Member States of approx. 250 beneficiaries of international protection is running and will be extended beyond its originally intended duration so as to facilitate the relocation of recently-arrived migrants in need of international protection.
Following the submission of an Action Plan to the European Commission in August 2010, Greece has embarked on a comprehensive overhaul of its asylum and migration system, and has received support from the Commission, the Member States, Norway, the UNHCR and other EU partners. Asylum Expert Teams coordinated by the EASO are now deployed there. Important new legislation has already been adopted by Greece in 2010, and its implementation is underway.
Existing Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) in Tanzania and Eastern Europe continued; the implementation of a new RPP in the Horn of Africa region started in September, in close cooperation with the UNHCR; and work advanced on the development of another RPP in North-Eastern Africa (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia).
Resettlement is equally essential in this context. Negotiations on the creation of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme must come to an operational and positive end. A strategic approach and political steering on the use of resettlement is needed.
3. Integration – a key element both for migrants and receiving societies
[***]
III. Addressing irregular migration to facilitate regular migration
| In 2009, the number of irregularly staying third country nationals apprehended in the EU-27 was about 570 000 (7% less than in 2008). Member States returned about 253 000 third country nationals (4.7% more than in 2008).
In 2010 63% (i.e. about 20 000 detections) of illegal border-crossings into the EU were detected in 3Q2010 at the Greek/Turkey land border. |
Effective measures aimed at preventing irregular immigration and at securing safe borders are an essential component of a coherent and credible EU immigration policy, but this policy must be fair and human rights must be respected.
1. Instruments for fighting irregular migration
Two legal key instruments have been adopted in recent years – the Return Directive 2008/115/EC and the Employer Sanctions’ Directive 2009/52/EC. They are in place now, but their state of transposition is far from satisfactory, in particular with respect to the Return Directive, where the implementation deadline passed on 24 December 2010. That is why its full and timely transposition is essential. Those provisions, which directly confer rights on migrants, may be, and already are, invoked in proceedings before national courts, and directly applied at the national level, regardless of whether national transposition legislation is in place.
Reinforced border control and cooperation with third countries, notably via readmission agreements, have already proved their effectiveness, as demonstrated in some Member States which have reported on their deterrent effect and on better-functioning return arrangements. However, there remains room for improving the effectiveness of readmission agreements at the EU level, as set out in the Commission’s Communication on the Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements (COM(2011)76). It is also clear that the higher number of joint return flights coordinated by Frontex in 2010 have been a success, earning the agency further support and increased financial means. Moreover, the 29 measures agreed by the Council to reinforce the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immigration are now being implemented. In its Staff Working Document[5] on the fulfilment of these 29 measures, the Commission reported in detail on progress achieved with regard to each measure, putting a special emphasis on the role played by Frontex, the development of EUROSUR and the ongoing dialogue on migration with main countries of origin and transit as part of the implementation of the Global Approach. These measures need to be accelerated and given priority.
The Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings, and protecting victims, the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator appointed by the Commission and a website on fight against trafficking in human beings[6] launched in 2010 have equipped the EU with new powers and ways to fight against this modern form of slavery. The recently adopted implementation report on Directive 2004/81/EC[7] on residence permits for victims of trafficking also called for their more effective protection, which should also help to dismantle networks of traffickers.
2. Effective border control
In 2010 the Commission proposed a Regulation on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the correct application of the Schengen acquis. In the light of recent experiences, its adoption must be a priority, so that the EU is better equipped to enforce a uniform application of the rules and take the appropriate measures if this would not be the case. Development of the Visa Information System (VIS) continued with the completion of the second and third major testing phases out of a total of four. Final agreement was reached on the technical specifications for the interaction of SIS II with the national systems. Member States continued to prepare the ground for establishing EUROSUR in line with the roadmap. EUROSUR will gradually establish a mechanism whereby Member States’ authorities carrying out border surveillance can cooperate and share operational information with each other and with Frontex, in order to reinforce the control of the external border of the Schengen area, especially its southern maritime and eastern land borders, and step up the fight against irregular migration and cross border crime. During the past year, the EU has faced critical situations at its borders, where it was confronted with high inflows of irregular migrants. This has been, and continues to represent, a major a test for the EU’s ability to react quickly and efficiently, while the Member States most directly concerned by migratory movements have required assistance in a spirit of solidarity. The achievements of Frontex are now broadly recognised and there is widespread agreement on the need to upgrade its role in order to enable it to be more effective.
The results of concerted EU action to tackle border-related crises have been mixed. On the one hand, the EU and the Member States have demonstrated that they are capable of responding decisively to address specific challenges faced by a Member State in effectively controlling its external borders. For the first time, following a request made by Greece related to the pressure on its land borders with Turkey, use was made of Frontex’s Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT). The swift deployment of the RABIT, strongly supported by participating Member States, stabilised the situation and brought down the number of arrivals compared to the peaks in 2010. Malta has recently requested deployment of the RABIT in view of the situation in the southern Mediterranean.
On the other hand, one of the lessons learnt from these events is that both increased cooperation and uniform application of the acquis must be better and more effectively ensured by all Member States. Coordinated preventive EU action vis à vis countries of origin is still slow and weak.
IV. Unaccompanied minors – a specific challenge
[***]
V. The External Dimension of EU migration Policy – The Global Approach
[***]
[1] http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13440.en08.pdf.
[3] A Commission Staff Working Paper provides more detail.
[4] * Under UNSCR 1244/1999.
[5] SEC (2010) 1480 final of 26.11.2010.
Filed under European Union, Frontex, Reports
Last week, UNHCR reported that hundreds of people who recently fled Libya to Tunisia and Egypt are returning to Libya in an effort to board boats for Europe. “Among them are refugees, including members of the Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean communities in the camps at Choucha near Tunisia’s border with Libya.” UNHCR is warning of the dangers of trying to reach Europe by sea and of returning to Libya. “UNHCR has met with refugees in Tripoli who are planning to make the perilous sea journey. ‘They are all aware of the high death toll, but they told us that they feel they have nothing to lose. One Eritrean man told us he would rather die trying to reach safety than continue to live in danger,’ [UNHCR’s chief spokesperson, Melissa] Fleming said.” “Fleming [also] said that UNHCR had learnt with sadness ‘that people on track for resettlement, following interviews last year in Libya, lost their lives while trying to reach Europe recently. People in the middle of the resettlement process and vulnerable cases are prioritized in our interview schedule.’”
Click here for UNHCR statement.
Filed under Egypt, European Union, Italy, Libya, Mediterranean, News, Tunisia, UNHCR
From Europa Press: Juan Martinez, Chief Inspector of the Spanish National Police’s Illegal Immigration Network and False Document Unit (UCRIF – Unidad Contra las Redes de Inmigración Ilegal y Falsedades Documentales), attributes the significant decline in the arrival of migrant boats in the Canary Islands to the deployment of Frontex, diplomatic management in the countries of origin, and repatriation policies. The article notes the first migrant boat arrival in the Canaries in 1994, the peak years of 2006-2008, and the ensuing practices which have halted further migrant arrivals.
Click here (ES) for article.
Filed under Eastern Atlantic, Frontex, News, Senegal, Spain
A delegation from the PACE Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population has just completed a two day visit to Lampedusa. The members of the delegation were Christopher Chope (United Kingdom, EDG), Chair of the Migration Committee, Giacomo Santini (Italy, EPP/CD), First Vice-Chair of the Migration Committee, Tineke Strik (Netherlands, SOC), Chair of the Sub-Committee on Refugees, Tina Acketoft (Sweden, ALDE), and Annette Groth (Germany, UEL). The delegation reported that while the situation in Lampedusa in regard to newly arriving migrants is under control when compared with the situation earlier in the year, the “reception facilities on Lampedusa were inadequate for longer stays – especially for vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied children – and that transfers to better-equipped centres elsewhere in Italy should be carried out within days: ‘In particular, the situation of the Tunisians that have been on the island in detention-like conditions for almost three weeks should be dealt with as soon as possible.’”
The delegation also said that “[t]he arrivals to Lampedusa are not the sole responsibility of a tiny island. There have been enough calls for responsibility-sharing and for solidarity. It is time that Europe acted on them. … Too many have already died at sea trying to reach Europe. … Europe must try to protect asylum seekers and refugees in a way that they are not forced to risk their lives first.”
Click here for PACE statement.
Click here for earlier announcement of the visit.
Filed under Council of Europe, Italy, Libya, Mediterranean, News, Reports, Tunisia
Migreurop has released a 48 page report (EN and FR) entitled “Frontex Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights.” The Report was prepared with a view to the revision of the Frontex mandate. Here are the Report’s conclusion and recommendations:
“It is not enough to decree that fundamental rights must be respected: it is also necessary to provide the legal means and democratic safeguards needed to achieve this. The proposal for a Regulation amending the Regulation establishing the FRONTEX Agency does neither of these things. Over the five years in which the Agency has been operating, many questions have been asked about the compatibility of its functioning with respect for the rights of individuals. The Commission’s proposed Regulation only addresses a very few of these questions, and raises many more. Until the Agency’s objectives are fundamentally reviewed and seen in the context of the threats the Agency poses to respect for rights, it is questionable whether FRONTEX itself is compatible with human rights. In the meantime, a number of measures should be introduced into the amended Regulation to bring the rules governing the functioning of FRONTEX more closely into line with standards on fundamental rights:
— There should be a clear division of responsibilities between Member States and FRONTEX in line with the Agency’s expanded role, ensuring that FRONTEX has full legal responsibility for acts committed during the operations that it coordinates, wherever they take place.
— It should be explicitly stated that all operations coordinated by FRONTEX must comply with EU directives on asylum, in particular Directive 2003/9 (on reception) and Directive 2005/85 (on procedures), as well as the principle of non-refoulement, including during interventions at sea wherever they take place, and during interventions involving officials acting under the authority of FRONTEX and liaison officers deployed by the Agency.
— It should be explicitly stated that operations coordinated by and/or involving officers placed under the authority of FRONTEX outside EU territory must be consistent with respect for the right to leave any country, including one’s own (Article 12.2 ICCPR).
— Independent monitoring mechanisms should be implemented during operations coordinated by FRONTEX (joint operations, joint return operations, deployment of liaison officers), and the conclusions and follow-up of monitoring operations should be communicated regularly to the European Parliament and made public.
— For monitoring of joint return operations, enough personnel should be made available to ensure that monitoring can take place at every stage, including inside the places of detention where deportees are held, onboard aircraft, and when deportees are handed over to the authorities of the country of return.
— The Code of Conduct for return operations should be made binding.
— Decisions taken by FRONTEX in relation to joint operations and pilot projects that it coordinates should be made available to the European Parliament.
— There should be mandatory consultation of the European Parliament whenever negotiations are opened between FRONTEX and a third country or the authorities of that country, and any agreement reached by FRONTEX during the negotiations should be submitted to the Parliament before being concluded.”
(While the Report was just added to the Migreurop web site, it may be that the French version of the report was released late last year.)
Click here (EN) or here (FR) for Report.
Filed under Analysis, European Union, Frontex
EurActiv.es conducted an interview in Spanish with Frontex Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias where he speaks about several topics, including Frontex’s response to the current situation in North Africa, the possible implications for Spain should unrest spread to Algeria or Morocco, Frontex’s budget shortfall and need for supplemental funding, and the problems experienced by Frontex when it attempts to negotiate cooperation or training agreements with third countries.
Click here for interview. (ES)
While irregular departures from Tunisia have been significantly reduced in number since Tunisian authorities resumed efforts to prevent or discourage such departures, bodies from earlier departures and accidents continue to wash ashore. The Financial Times reports that “62 bodies [were] found [during the first week of May] near Sfax, Kerkennah and Chaffar, up the coastline from Zarzis, apparently from boats lost weeks earlier.” 58 bodies were discovered during the month of April. FT also reported that “[u]nder the previous regime, would-be illegal migrants risked a fortnight in jail for ‘infringement of frontiers’; now there are no penalties imposed on those who attempted the illegal crossing.”
Click here for FT article (free access, but registration may be required).
Click here for previous post.
Filed under European Union, Italy, Mediterranean, News, Tunisia
The latest edition of the European Journal of Migration and Law, Volume 13, Number 2, contains an article by Stefanie Grant, University of Sussex, entitled “Recording and Identifying European Frontier Deaths.”
Abstract: “Migrant deaths at EU maritime borders have more often been seen in the context of national border control, than in terms of migrant protection and human rights. The 2009 Stockholm Programme accepted the need for action to avoid tragedies at sea, and to `record’ and `identify’ migrants trying to reach the EU. But it did not specify how this should be done. There are parallels between these migrant deaths, and deaths which occur in conflict and humanitarian disaster. The principles of human rights and humanitarian law which apply in these situations should be developed to create legal and policy frameworks for use in the case of migrants who are missing or who die on EU sea frontiers. The purpose would be to enable evidence of identity to be preserved, to protect the rights of families to know the fate of their relatives, and to create common national and international procedures.”
“This article draws on publications by the author, including: ‘Migration and frontier deaths: a right to identity’, in Marie Bénédicte-Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.), Are Human Rights for Migrants?: Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, Abingdon, Routledge, 2011 [in press]; ‘The Legal Protection of Stranded Migrants’, in Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud and Euan Macdonald (eds.), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, pp. 29–48; and ‘International Migration and Human Rights’; expert paper for the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), 2005.”
Click here for link. (Subscription or payment required.)
Filed under Analysis, Eastern Atlantic, European Union, Mediterranean
A total of 612 migrants in 24 different boats have reached the Andalusian coast of Spain (Almeria, Granada, Cadiz and Huelva) from Morocco and Algeria so far in 2011.
Click here for article (ES).
Filed under Algeria, Data / Stats, Eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, Morocco, News, Spain
The European Voice reported last week that the European Commission will likely adopt a new Communication on migration when the Commission meets on 24 May. “A communication expected to be adopted by European commissioners … proposes that the countries of the region should receive increased assistance for managing migration in return for commitments to accept repatriated migrants and to tighten border controls. … [The new expected] communication follows a broader communication on migration adopted by the Commission on 4 May. A national diplomat said that the measures outlined in the two communications go ‘in the right direction’ but that the member states were now waiting for actual legislative proposals….”
Click here for EV article.
Click here for Communication on Migration of 4 May.
Click here for previous post regarding Communication of 4 May.
Filed under European Union, Frontex, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mediterranean, News, Tunisia
Real Instituto Elcano has published an analysis regarding the situation in North Africa and its impact on irregular immigration to the EU. The analysis was written by Frontex’s Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias.
Of particular interest is the analysis regarding what Frontex believes might occur in regard to migrant flows from Libya under two different scenarios: Gadafi remaining in power or ultimately being removed from power (see Google translation of excerpt below):
“… En el caso de que el régimen de Gadafi recupere el control, la UE y sus Estados Miembros no podrán reanudar la cooperación con un régimen totalmente desacreditado. Se producirá el cese en la aplicación de acuerdos de cooperación policial que en el pasado (desde mayo de 2009) sirvieron para detener los flujos de inmigración irregular desde Libia hacia Italia y Malta. La posibilidad de que ciudadanos de otros países africanos bloqueados en Libia sean obligados o “ayudados” a emigrar a la UE no debe descartarse. De hecho, Gadafi ha amenazado con “abrir la puerta” de la inmigración ilegal hacia Europa.
La OIM estima la cifra de extranjeros presentes en Libia entre 0,5 y 1,5 millones. No obstante, no todos serian candidatos a la inmigración ilegal. Se trata fundamentalmente de trabajadores empleados por empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país, por lo que su intención primaria no sería la emigración a la UE y por otra parte una buena parte de ellos ya han abandonado Libia.
En el peor de los casos, la consecuencia de ese “abrir la puerta” sería la reactivación de los flujos por vía marítima hacia Lampedusa y Malta (eventualmente también Creta, que se encuentra a 200 km de distancia de la costa libia) en un escenario similar al de 2008 (40.000 inmigrantes llegaron a Italia y Malta, con origen en las costas libias) agravado por el efecto adicional de la inestabilidad en el país. Su destino principal serían los países con presencia importante de ciudadanos norteafricanos (Italia, Francia, España, Bélgica y el Reino Unido). El destino de los nacionales de países subsaharianos se encontraría más repartido por toda la UE.
Si Gadafi es derrocado resultará clave la capacidad y rapidez de la oposición para reorganizarse. La oposición se encuentra, por el momento, bastante desorganizada y es probable que se produzcan luchas internas por el poder, especialmente por el control de los campos petrolíferos. Ello podría conducir a un estado persistente de disturbios y a una ausencia de control por un largo periodo de tiempo.
La eventual reactivación de las rutas migratorias hacia la UE dependerá de la capacidad del nuevo régimen para imponer la ley y el orden en el país así como el control efectivo sobre los 2.000 km de costas y 4.000 km de fronteras terrestres libias. En el peor de los escenarios podría darse una situación similar a la de Somalia.
En este escenario, la economía libia puede deteriorarse y elevarse los niveles de desempleo. Actualmente se desconoce la tasa de desempleo en Libia, pero se presume baja. Previsiblemente, la mayoría de los trabajadores desempleados intentará regresar a sus países, pero parte de ellos (sobre todo los nacionales de países inseguros) buscaran otras oportunidades, entre ellas la emigración clandestina a la UE.
La ausencia de ley y orden, especialmente la ausencia de control sobre las fronteras marítimas, llevará rápidamente a las mafias al tráfico de inmigrantes hacia la UE. Los candidatos serían primariamente trabajadores desempleados no deseosos de volver a sus países (mayormente de África Occidental y Oriental, pero eventualmente también libios, egipcios, argelinos y tunecinos). Esta situación impediría, por otra parte, el retorno de quienes fuesen detectados cruzando ilegalmente las fronteras exteriores de la UE.
En tales circunstancias se puede prever un flujo constante de inmigración ilegal durante meses, mayoritariamente por vía marítima, pero también por vía aérea a través de Turquía. La duración en el tiempo de este escenario dependerá de la rapidez con la que la UE o los Estados Miembros y las nuevas autoridades sean capaces de restablecer la cooperación. En este sentido, serán determinantes los acuerdos de readmisión efectivos.
Por último, ha de tenerse también en cuenta el riesgo marginal de que los vencedores realicen acciones de persecución sobre los partidarios de Gadafi, lo que provocaría la huida de éstos del país en busca de refugio….”
Google translation of the above excerpts (NB – this is only a rough translation):
“…In the case of Qaddafi’s regime regaining control, the EU and its Member States shall not resume cooperation with a discredited regime. Termination will occur in the implementation of agreements on police cooperation in the past (May 2009) served to stop the flow of illegal immigration from Libya to Italy and Malta. The possibility for citizens from other African countries locked in Libya are forced or “helped” to migrate to the EU can not be ruled out. In fact, Gaddafi has threatened to “open the door” of illegal immigration into Europe.
The IOM estimates the number of foreigners in Libya between 0.5 and 1.5 million. However, not all candidates would be illegal immigration. These are mainly employed by foreign companies settled in the country, so that their primary intention would not be the migration to the EU and, moreover, a good portion of them have already left Libya.
In the worst case, the consequence of this “open door” would be the reactivation of the flows by sea to Lampedusa and Malta (and possibly Crete, which is 200 km away from the Libyan coast) in a scenario similar to that of 2008 (40.000 immigrants arrived in Italy and Malta, departing from the Libyan coast) aggravated by the additional effect of instability in the country. Its main destination countries would be a significant presence of North African citizens (Italy, France, Spain, Belgium and the UK). The fate of the national sub-Saharan countries would be more distributed throughout the EU.
If Gadhafi is overthrown will be key capacity and speed of the opposition to regroup. The opposition is, at present, quite disorganized and is likely to produce internal power struggles, especially for control of the oilfields. This could lead to a persistent state of unrest and a lack of control over a long period of time.
The eventual recovery of migratory routes towards the EU depends on the ability of the new regime to impose law and order in the country as well as effective control over the 2,000 km of coastline and 4,000 km of land borders Libya. In the worst case scenario could be a situation similar to Somalia.
In this scenario, the Libyan economy may deteriorate and unemployment levels rise. Currently unknown unemployment rate in Libya, but presumably low. Predictably, most unemployed workers try to return to their countries, but some of them (especially insecure country nationals) to seek other opportunities, including illegal migration to the EU.
The absence of law and order, especially the lack of control over maritime borders, whisk the trafficking mafias immigrants into the EU. Candidates would be primarily unemployed workers eager to return to their countries (mostly from West and East Africa, but also possibly Libyans, Egyptians, Algerians and Tunisians). This would prevent, on the other hand, the return of those who were detected illegally crossing the external borders of the EU.
In such circumstances, can provide a steady flow of illegal immigration for months, mostly by sea, but also by air through Turkey. The long life of this scenario depends on the speed with which the EU or the Member States and the new authorities are able to restore cooperation. In this regard, will determine the effective readmission agreements.
Finally, it must also take into account the marginal risk that the winners perform acts of persecution on Gaddafi’s supporters, causing them to flee the country in search of refuge….”
Click here for the Analysis. (ES)
Here is an op-ed article from Thursday’s New York Times by Hans Lucht, an anthropologist at the University of Copenhagen and author of the forthcoming “Darkness Before Daybreak: African Migrants Living on the Fringes in Southern Italy Today.” (Scheduled for release Dec. 2011.)
“…. In the long run, Europe should learn from the situation in Libya that paying dictators to make ‘problems’ disappear is not only morally bankrupt but also short-sighted. European leaders must seek commitments from any post-Qaddafi government to handle the challenges of international migration in an orderly and humane fashion. Instead of banishing asylum-seekers to detention camps in the desert, Europe should offer support to Tunisia and Egypt, which are struggling to assist refugees from Libya, and to southern European countries….”
Click here for article.
Filed under Analysis, European Union, Ghana, Italy, Libya, Mediterranean
The Sunday Times of Malta reports that Malta has again declined to host a Frontex mission because Malta objects to the rules of engagement for such missions which require under certain circumstances that intercepted migrants be brought to the territory of the Member State hosting the mission. “‘If Frontex changes its mind and manages to convince the other member states about the rules of engagement for the mission it wants to hold in Malta, we will reconsider our position. However, at this stage, we have ruled out the possibility of hosting a Frontex mission’ said [Home Affairs Minister Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici.]” “Frontex sources said other member states had been sounded out on Malta’s demand to have different rules for its mission based on the ‘closest safe port’ concept. However, the Warsaw-based agency failed to convince them.”
Click here for article.
Click here, here, and here for previous posts on the Malta–Frontex negotiations.
Filed under European Union, Frontex, Malta, Mediterranean, News
MIGRANTS AT SEA 